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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MATTHEW DESPAIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010761-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to operation of a clandestine 
laboratory, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (Supp. 
2001) in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Lynn W. Davis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Should officers be permitted to routinely ask whether a motorist 
possesses any weapons during a traffic stop? 
Standard of Review: "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 
(Utah 1996). 
Issue No. 2: Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, where the officers 
knew of defendant's prior arrest for possession of a concealed weapon and where 
defendant exhibited suspicions behavior, did the officers have reasonable suspicion to ask 
whether defendant possessed any weapons? 
Standard of Review: (same as above). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with operation of a clandestine laboratory, 
possession or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, both second degree 
felonies, transportation or possession of items prohibited in a correctional and mental 
health facility, a third degree felony, reckless cndangerment, a class A misdemeanor, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, both class 
B misdemeanors. R. 3-5. A forfeiture demand was also entered. Id. Defendant filed a 
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motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle and attached trailer. 
R. 38-45. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a written ruling denying 
defendant's motion. R. 147:22. 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to Count I of the charges, reserving his 
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 64-71, 74-75. 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years. R. 77-
81. That sentence was suspended, however, and defendant was ordered to serve nine 
months in jail and 36 months probation. Id. The court also ordered defendant's forfeiture 
of $1,416.00 cash found in the search. R. 72-73. Defendant timely appeals his 
conviction. R. 84-85. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Armed and dangerous. Shortly after midnight on November 6, 1999, while on 
patrol, Officers Troy Slaugh and Rusty Olsen observed a pickup truck pulling a large 
trailer with no license plate lights proceeding through a nearby intersection. R. 87:81-82; 
106:5-6, 9-10. A check of the truck's license plate number revealed that the vehicle was 
registered to defendant. R. 87:82; 106:6, 39. Officer Slaugh immediately remembered 
defendant's name from an encounter which occurred a month prior where defendant was 
jThe facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying 
defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 
1997). The facts are taken from testimony given at the suppression hearing and at the 
preliminary hearing upon which the trial court relied on in making its decision. See R. 
106:3-4. 
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found to be in possession of drugs and a concealed handgun. R. 106:39-40. As a result 
of that encounter, Officer Slaugh considered defendant to be "armed and dangerous." R. 
106:40. 
Recognizing a license plate violation, the officers stopped defendant and parked 
their patrol car behind his trailer on the side of the road. R. 87:82; 106:6, 9. The area 
was dark and visibility was extremely limited, R. 87:78. Officer Slaugh began walking 
toward the driver's side of defendant's vehicle while Officer Olsen went toward the 
passenger side. R. 87:77; 106:7.2 As the officers neared the back of defendant's truck, a 
large black rottweiler aggressively lunged at Officer Slaugh, barking uncontrollably from 
inside the open trick bed. R. 87:83-84; 106:7. Fearing that the dog would attack, the 
officers drew their service weapons and retreated toward the back of the trailer. R. 87:83; 
106:7-8. At that point, defendant exited his vehicle, shut his door, and stood beside it. R. 
106:8. Officer Slaugh yelled to defendant to meet him behind the trailer, away from the 
dog. Id. Defendant did not comply. Id. Instead, he got back in his vehicle and shut his 
door. Id. The officers could not see what defendant was doing inside the vehicle. R. 
87:78; 106:8-9. 
After Officer Slaugh called a second time, defendant exited his vehicle and met the 
officers behind his trailer. R. 106:9. Defendant was dressed in blue jeans and a loose 
plaid shirt which he wore untucked, completely covering his waist and extending down to 
2Although Officer Olsen was not in uniform, he was on duty and was carrying his 
badge and service weapon. R. 106:9. 
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his upper thigh. R. 106:12, 15,43. When Officer Slaugh asked to see defendant's driver's 
license and registration, defendant moved his hands toward his back pocket. R. 106:10, 
43. Noticing that defendant's waistband was concealed, Officer Olsen immediately asked 
defendant "if he had any weapons on him." R. 106:10. In response, defendant shifted his 
hands towards his waist area, stating that he had two knifes. R. 106:11,43. Before 
defendant moved any further, Officer Olsen grabbed defendant and retrieved a large 
hunting-style knife with a sharp six-inch blade which was attached to defendant's belt and 
placed horizontally across defendant's stomach. R. 87:78; 106:11-12, 15. The knife was 
loosely sheathed, easily accessible, and well concealed from view under defendant's shirt. 
R. 87:78; 106:11-13, 15-16,43-44. The officer also retrieved a smaller pocket knife 
located on defendant's right hip, also attached to his belt with a sheath. R. 87:78; 106:13. 
After defendant had been disarmed, Officer Slaugh returned to his vehicle to 
perform a records check on defendant's driver's license and to check Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-10-501 and 76-10-504, to determine whether defendant's large knife hidden under his 
shirt constituted a concealed dangerous weapon. R. 106:13-14. Based on the language of 
the two statutes, Officer Slaugh concluded that defendant had violated the law. R. 
106:14. Defendant was placed under arrest for possession of a concealed dangerous 
weapon. R. 106:16. 
The search. Incident to defendant's arrest, the officers arranged for a passenger, 
defendant's wife, to restrain and remove the dog, and executed a search of defendant's 
truck. R. 106:16-17. While searching, the officers discovered a small container of 
5 
marijuana and a glass pipe containing methamphetamine crystals in the cab of the truck. 
R. 106:19-21, 23-24, 59-63. Inside a backpack located in the bed of the truck, officers 
found a glass pipe containing marijuana residue and a small blue container of marijuana. 
R. 106:19,22. 
The officers also inventoried defendant's trailer. R. 106:24-25. Inside the trailer 
they found various items consistent with a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, 
including a glass tube approximately five feet long, a small glass tube about eleven inches 
long with a rubber connector attached to it, a trash sack full of small containers identical 
to those found in the in the truck, and large barrels of unknown chemicals. R. 106:25-26, 
36-37, 63-65. Given the likelihood that the chemicals were hazardous, the officers ceased 
the inventory and arranged for defendant's truck and trailer to be towed to the impound 
lot. R. 106:27-28, 
The next day, upon resuming their inventory of the trailer, the officers found a 
mason jar full of blue crystal iodine pellets of the type used to produce methamphetamine, 
more small containers, and a glass flask. R. 106:28-32, 38, 65-66. At that point, Officer 
Slaugh was convinced that the trailer contained a methamphetamine laboratory so he 
contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration, applied for and received a search 
warrant, and continued to inventory the contents of the trailer. R. 106:32, 38. That 
search revealed several bottles of hydrogen peroxide and ethyl alcohol, two liquid 
chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine. R. 106:32-33, 38-39. 
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Suppression hearing. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that 
Officer's Olsen's question as whether defendant possessed any weapons constituted an 
illegal detention. R. 38-45. After reviewing the evidence offered at the suppression 
hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion, holding that defendant was not 
unreasonably detained when the question was asked, and that Officer Slaugh's knowledge 
of defendant's very recent possession of a concealed weapon was sufficient to permit the 
question. R. 46-52. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
POINT I: Defendant claims that Officer Olsen's question during a traffic stop as 
to whether defendant possessed any weapons was constitutionally improper. However, in 
United States v. Holt, based on the United States Supreme Court's longstanding 
recognition of the inherent dangers of traffic stops, the Tenth Circuit recently held that an 
officer may ask a motorist if he possesses any loaded weapons regardless of whether he 
has reasonable suspicion or a subjective fear that the motorist is armed. This Court 
should adopt that precedent. 
When balancing a motorist's privacy interests against the State's strong interests in 
protecting police officers placed in precarious positions during traffic stops, it is clear that 
the motorist's interests are outweighed. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the 
dangerous nature of traffic stops and the need for additional reasonable precautions to 
protect officers in the line of duty. Furthermore, Utah courts have stated that an officer 
can order the passengers out of a vehicle and detain them long enough to perform a 
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warrants check without reasonable suspicion. A brief question about weapons is no more 
intrusive than those accepted practices. In any event, a motorist generally expects an 
officer to take reasonable precautions to protect his or her safety. Where the State's 
strong interests in protecting police officers outweighs the privacy interests of a motorist, 
this Court should follow Holt, holding that an officer may briefly ask a motorist if he or 
she possesses any weapons, irrespective of whether that officer has reasonable suspicion 
that the motorist is armed. 
POINT II: Notwithstanding the applicability of Holt9 under a totality of the 
circumstances the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant 
was armed. When combined with other factors, Officer Slaugh's knowledge of 
defendant's recent prior encounter with police wherein defendant was found to be in 
possession of narcotics and a concealed handgun, was enough to create a reasonable 
suspicion that defendant was presently armed. Those factors included defendant's 
defiance of Officer Slaugh's order to meet him behind the trailer away from defendant's 
aggressive dog, the fact that the officers could not view defendant's actions when he 
reentered his vehicle, the remote location and late hour when the traffic stop occurred, 
and the fact that when defendant finally complied with the officers' orders to exit his 
vehicle, his waist area was completely concealed by his untucked shirt. Accordingly, a 
reasonably careful officer under those circumstances would have believed that defendant 
was presently armed and dangerous. Thus, Officer Olsen's question was justified to 
protect both officers' safety. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONSISTENT WITH TENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, 
OFFICERS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ASK 
WHETHER A MOTORIST POSSESSES ANY 
WEAPONS DURING A TRAFFIC STOP 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not suppressing evidence obtained 
through a search of his vehicle and trailer during a routine traffic stop. Br. of Aplt. at 7-
19. Specifically, defendant argues that his arrest resulting from Officer Olsen's question 
as to whether defendant possessed any weapons was illegal because the question was 
beyond the scope of the original purpose for the traffic stop and was unsupported by 
reasonable suspicion. Id. Thus, defendant claims that the evidence obtained through the 
search incident to his arrest was tainted by the prior illegality and therefore inadmissable. 
Id? 
Defendant's objection to Officer Olsen's question ignores both the United States 
Supreme Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's express recognition of the dangerous 
nature of traffic stops. Moreover, in United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 
2001), the Tenth Circuit recently held that regardless of whether an officer has any 
reasonable suspicion that the motorist possesses a weapon or whether an officer 
subjectively fears the motorist, an officer may ask a motorist if he or she possesses any 
3On appeal, defendant does not challenge appropriateness of the search incident to 
his arrest. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-20. Therefore, his claim hinges only on the legality of his 
arrest. 
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loaded weapons. Id. at 1226. This Court should adopt that rule. 
In Holt, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol established a driver's license checkpoint at 
approximately 10:30 in the evening. Id. at 1218. When Holt approached the checkpoint, 
Officer Tucker noticed that Holt was not wearing a seatbelt. Id. Holt was asked to 
produce his driver's license, exit his vehicle, and join Officer Tucker in his patrol car. Id. 
While in the patrol car, Officer Tucker asked Holt if "there was anything in [Holt's] 
vehicle [that Officer Tucker] should know about such as loaded weapons." Id. Holt 
responded that there was a loaded pistol behind the passenger seat of his vehicle. Id. 
After asking for Holt's consent to search his vehicle, Officer Tucker found the loaded 
pistol where Holt had said it would be. Id. at 1219. The encounter lasted approximately 
three to four minutes. Id. A subsequent search of the back of Holt's vehicle revealed 
drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. Later, based on Holt's motion, the district court 
suppressed the gun and the contraband found in his vehicle. Id. The government 
appealed the district court's ruling. Id. 
Citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals laid out the general principles for determining whether an officer can ask a 
motorist if he or she possesses any weapons. 
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular invasion of a 
citizen's personal security. Reasonableness, of course, depends on a 
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. 
Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09). Accordingly, under a totality 
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of the circumstances test, the Tenth Circuit "assess[ed] the reasonableness of [the] traffic 
stop based on an observed violation by considering the scope of the officer's actions and 
balancing the motorist's legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's law-
enforcement-related interests." Id. 
In applying that balance, the Tenth Circuit noted that "a motorist expects an officer 
to take reasonable measures to protect officer safety during the stop." Given that, the 
courts have recognized that the government's strong interest in officer safety, when not 
too intrusive, outweighs the motorist's interests. Id. As examples the Holt court cited the 
officer's right to detain the motorist while performing a background check for outstanding 
warrants and criminal history, and the officer's right to order the driver and passengers 
out of the vehicle even in the absence of any particularized suspicion of personal danger. 
Id. at 1221-22 (citing Unites States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528,1535 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996) 
("[warrant] checks are run largely to protect the officer); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 
408, 415 (1997) (officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle even without any 
particularized suspicion of personal danger); and Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,111 (driver may 
be ordered to exit the vehicle in the interest of officer safety)).4 Although these rights 
4The Tenth Circuit also listed "other situations in which federal courts have 
allowed considerations of officer safety to outweigh fairly intrusive conduct during a 
traffic stop." Holt, 264 F.3d at 1223 (citing Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 
53 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (officers may order the passengers to remain in the vehicle); United 
States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 981 (4th Cir. 1997) (officer may open the door of a 
vehicle with darkly tinted windows to check for weapons); United States v. Moorefield, 
111 F.3d 10, 13 (3rd Cir. 1997 (officers may order the occupants to raise their hands 
during the stop); and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (officers may use a 
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have nothing to do with the original purpose for the stop, they are justified by the 
government's strong interest in protecting its police officers. Id. Therefore, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that "the individual-privacy-interests side of the Fourth Amendment 
balancing is weaker in this context, [and] the governmental-interests side is much 
stronger." Id. at 1222. Thus, the Holt court held that an officer is justified in asking a 
motorist if he or she possesses any loaded weapons, regardless of whether he has 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the motorist is armed. Id. at 1226. 
In support of its holding, the Holt court recognized that "'law enforcement 
officials literally risk their lives each time they approach occupied vehicles during the 
course of investigative traffic stops/" and cited the United States Supreme Court's 
longstanding acknowledgment of the dangerous nature of traffic stops. Id. (citing 
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978; and McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536 n. 6 (noting the "tragedy of the 
many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year")). Specifically, in 
1977, twenty-four years before Holt was decided, the Supreme Court "found it 'too plain 
for argument' that the government's interest in officer safety is 'both legitimate and 
weighty/ given the 'inordinate risks confronting an officer as he approaches a person 
seated in an automobile.'" Id. (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110). In that year, the High 
Court noted that t4[t]hirty percent of police shootings occurred when a police officer 
flashlight to check the dark interior of a car) (plurality opinion)). Indeed, as the Holt 
court noted, the intrusive nature of those practices is far greater than a mere question as to 
possession of weapons. Id. 
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approached a suspect seated in an auto mobile, and 'a significant percentage of murders 
of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops/" Id. at 1222-23 
(citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (citations omitted)). Seventeen years after Mimms, the 
Supreme Court recognized that 5,762 officer were assaulted and 11 were killed during 
traffic pursuits and stops, in 1994 alone. Id. at 1222 (citing Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413). 
Given those facts, the Tenth Circuit also observed that "the most recent data 
reveals that in 1999, 6,048 officers were assaulted during traffic pursuits and stops and 8 
were killed." Id. at 1223 (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: 
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 82, 28 (1999)). Further, the court offered 
statistics revealing that "[m]ore than 34% of those assaults involved a dangerous weapon 
such as a gun or knife[,]" and that "[f]irearms were used to commit 82 of the 94 killings 
of law enforcement officers during traffic pursuits and stops during the 1990s." Id. 
(citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement 
Officers Killed and Assaulted 83-84,28 (1999)). 
The Holt court summarized its morbid findings in two paragraphs. 
The terrifying truth is that officers face a very real risk of being assaulted 
with a dangerous weapon each time they stop a vehicle. The officer 
typically has to leave his vehicle, thereby exposing himself to potential 
assault by the motorist. The officer approaches the vehicle not knowing 
who the motorist is or what the motorist's intentions might be. It is 
precisely during such an exposed stop that the courts have been willing to 
give the officers 'wide latitude,' Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978, to discern the 
threat the motorist may pose to officer safety. 
An officer in today's reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his 
or her life every time a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is a 
13 
confrontation. The motorist must suspend his plans and anticipates 
receiving a fine and perhaps even a jail term. That expectation becomes 
even more real when the motorist or a passenger knows there are 
outstanding arrest warrants or current criminal activity that may be 
discovered during the course of the stop. Resort to a loaded weapon is an 
increasingly plausible option for many such motorists to escape those 
consequences, and the officer, when stopping a car on a routine traffic stop 
never knows in advance which motorists have that option by virtue of 
possession of a loaded weapon in the car. 
#o//,264F.3datl223.5 
Next, citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Whren v. United States and New 
York v. Quarles, the Holt court explained "that the balance does not depend on whether 
the officer subjectively fears the motorist." Id. at 1225 (citing Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996) (Fourth Amendment analysis rarely includes subjective 
intentions) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) ("[T]he availability of 
[the public safety] exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual 
officers involved).]"). Rather, the test is an objective one. Id. "That one officer is 
braver (or more foolhardy) than another, and therefore not subjectively concerned for his 
5In response to the argument that a motorist in possession of a weapon is unlikely 
to admit that fact, the Tenth Circuit noted that Holt's admission to possession of the 
handgun tends to undercut that argument. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1223-24. Irrespective of that, 
the Holt court recognized that a motorist's false denial may provide important clues to 
officers trained to recognize suspicious and evasive behavior, concerning the motorist's 
true intentions. Id. Similarly, important clues warranting prudent behavior may also be 
gathered where a motorist declines to answer the officer's question. Id. Thus, the Holt 
court concluded that "any response the officer receives in response to [a weapons] 
question will be helpful in appraising the risk presented more accurately." However, the 
Tenth Circuit also cautioned officers that they may not use the refusal to answer a 
weapons question as the basis for a more intrusive search. Id. 
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or her safety, should not deprive that particular officer of a right to protect his or her 
safety. Even the brave officer should be allowed to minimize the ever-present risk of 
being attacked or killed." Id. at 1225-26. 
Based on its through findings and analysis, the Tenth Circuit concluded "that the 
government's interest in officer safety outweighs a motorist's interest in not being asked 
about the presence of loaded weapons." Id. at 1226. Where the scales are so tilted in 
favor of officer safety, the Tenth Circuit ruled that an officer's question is justified ueven 
when the officer lacks particularized suspicion that the motorist possesses loaded 
weapons and regardless of whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist." Id. 
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Utah Supreme Court has followed federal courts in 
recognizing that officer safety is an overriding concern in traffic stops. See State v. 
James, 2000 UT 80, % 10,13 P.3d 576. Utah law enforcement is not immune from the 
national trend. See, e.g., State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 fl2-5,994 P.2d 177 (passenger in 
traffic stop shot at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his hands); State v. 
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without warning as 
officer approached vehicle). Given those concerns, Utah courts have also permitted 
officers to take certain measures, at least in part, in the pursuit of officer safety. See 
James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 ("Owing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of 
the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the 
course of the investigation.") (citing Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412-15 and Mimms, 434 U.S. 
110-11); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Utah 1994) (officer may ask for a 
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driver's license and vehicle registration and may make an inquiry concerning the 
suspicious conduct of the person detained); State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 280 
(Utah App. 1992) (officer may run a computer check for any outstanding warrants); and 
State v. O 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998) (officer's visual inspection of the 
vehicle was necessary to ensure his safety). These and other articulated safety 
precautions weigh in favor of allowing an officer to briefly ask whether a motorist 
possesses any weapons. 
Here, as in Holt, Officer Olsen's question as to whether defendant possessed any 
weapons could hardly be intrusive.6 The question was asked immediately after Officer 
Slaugh requested defendant's driver's license, and therefore was not even as remote in 
time as the question posed to Holt while he was seated in the officer's patrol car. See R. 
106:10; Holt, 264 F.3d 1218. When compared to a permissible warrants check and an 
order to exit the vehicle, the officer's question was much more brief and less intrusive. 
See James, 2000 UT 80, f10;and Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d at 280. Additionally, the 
legitimate officer safety concerns related to traffic stops as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the Tenth Circuit in Holt, weigh 
heavily in favor of permitting the officer's question. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,23 
Indeed, under many states' concealed weapons laws a motorist stopped by police 
is obligated to notify the officer that the motorist is carrying a concealed weapon. See 
Alaska Stat. § 18.65.750 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3112 (2000); Ark. Code Ann. 
§ 5-73-315 (2001); La. Rev. Stat Ann. § 1379.3 (2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.11 
(2002); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 1290.8 (2001); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.205 (2001). 
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(1968) (^ American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in 
this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands 
more are wounded .. .with guns and knifes . . . [c]ertainly it would be unreasonable to 
require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. "). 
Although the officer in Holt asked the defendant whether he possessed any "loaded 
weapons," the officer here asked if defendant possessed any "weapons." This distinction, 
however, is irrelevant under Utah law. Both a knife and gun are defined as dangerous 
weapons under Utah's concealed dangerous weapons statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-501 (Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp 2001); State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920,929-30 (Utah App. 1991). 
Because the State's immediate interest in officer safety heavily outweighs 
defendant's interest in not being asked about the presence weapons, this Court should 
adopt the rule articulated by the Tenth Circuit, and hold that an officer may briefly ask a 
motorist if he or she possesses any weapons even when the officer lacks particularized 
suspicion and regardless of whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist7 
7The State is not asserting that an officer may question a motorist about the 
presence of drugs without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. See State v. Hansen, 
2000 UT App. 353,1f 16,17 P.3d 1135. 
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POINT II 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 
TENTH CIRCUIT'S RULING IN HOLT, UNDER A 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS, 
THE OFFICERS' BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
POTENTIALLY ARMED WAS REASONABLE 
The Fourth Amendment provides protection from "unreasonable searches and 
seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. It necessarily follows that '"what the Constitution 
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but [only] unreasonable searches and seizures.'" 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 
(I960)). "Reasonableness, of course, depends on a balance between the public interest 
and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers." Mimrns, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Accordingly, no one factor is determinative in a reasonableness analysis; instead, 
reasonableness is "measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the 
circumstances." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
Defendant argues that Officer Olsen's question as to whether defendant possessed 
any weapons was improper because the question went beyond the scope of the original 
purpose for the traffic stop and was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Br. of Aplt. at 
7-19. But defendant ignores the other circumstances surrounding the traffic stop. See id. 
Thus, the question here is not whether the officers' knowledge of defendant's prior 
concealed weapons charge was alone enough to establish a reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was presently dangerous. Rather, the question in this case, where the validity 
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of the stop is unchallenged, is whether given a totality of the circumstances, including the 
fact of defendant's prior concealed weapon charge, would make a reasonably careful 
officer more concerned for his or her safety. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop indicates that the 
officers' safety concerns were legitimate. At the onset of the encounter, Officer Slaugh's 
knowledge of defendant's prior criminal charge for possession of contraband and a 
concealed handgun raised a reasonable likelihood that defendant was presently armed and 
dangerous. The prior encounter with police was recent, occurring only a month before 
the instant stop, and was therefore vivid in the officer's mind. See R. 106:39-40. Indeed, 
as a result of that encounter, Officer Slaugh testified that he considered defendant to be 
"armed and dangerous." See R. 106:40. Accordingly, the officer's knowledge of 
defendant's prior arrest was relevant to his suspicion that defendant was presently 
dangerous. See State v. White, 856 P.2d 656,661 (Utah App. 1993) (although not 
determinative, a previous police encounter may be relevant to a suspicion that a suspect 
might be presently dangerous); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986) (Officers 
may protect themselves and others when they "knowingly and willingly enter hostile 
environs to confront dangerous persons"); United States v. Hughes, 15 F.3d 798, 802 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (officer's prior knowledge of the defendant's tendency to carry a weapon 
justified a subsequent search for weapons); State v. Collins, 847 P.2d 919,922-24 (Wash. 
1993) (officer's memory of the defendant's prior felony together with two other factors 
was enough to support reasonable suspicion for a safety frisk). 
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Additionally, while approaching defendant's vehicle, the officers were initially 
surprised by a large and aggressive Rottweiler, barking and lunging at the officers from 
the back of defendant's truck. See R. 87:83-84; 106:7. Fearing for their safety, the 
officers immediately drew their service weapons and retreated toward the back of the 
trailer. R. 87:83; 106:7-8. While the presence of the dog is not directly relevant to 
whether defendant was armed, it certainly heightened the mounting tension surrounding 
the stop and raised both parties' apprehensions. See R. 106:8 (upon hearing the dog bark, 
defendant immediately exited his vehicle, shut the door, and stood beside it). 
More importantly, however, defendant's suspicious behavior during the stop 
provided the additional suspicion necessary to solidify the officer's safety concerns. 
While defendant was standing beside his vehicle, Officer Slaugh yelled to him, 
commanding him to meet him at the back of the trailer, away from the dog. See R. 106:8-
9. Despite the officer's clear order, defendant got back into his truck and shut the door. 
See id. Due to the darkness and the fact that the dog and the truck door were blocking the 
officers' view, they were unable to see what defendant was doing inside the vehicle. See 
R. 87:78; 106:8-9. Finally, after being commanded to exit the vehicle a second time, 
defendant left his vehicle and approached the officers. SeeK. 106:9. However, 
defendant's entire waist was concealed by an untucked shirt, thus further arousing the 
officers' sense of danger. See R. 106:12, 15,43. State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185 
(Utah App. 1996) (In determining the reasonableness of a given situation, "common 
sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria") (quotations 
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omitted)). Moreover, this stop occurred at shortly after midnight; "an individual who has 
been stopped may be more willing to commit violence against a police officer at a time 
when few people are likely to be present to witness it." Collins, 847 P.2d at 922. 
Given the knowledge of defendant's prior concealed weapons charge, and the 
tension created by an encounter with defendant's aggressive dog, a reasonably careful 
officer would have feared that defendant's disobedience was an attempt to arm himself by 
concealing a weapon under his shirt. See United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 
(10th Cir. 2000) ("While knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement is not 
sufficient itself to even rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, it can combine with other 
factors to support the requisite standard of suspicion.''). 'These dangers are proper 
considerations for a reasonably careful police officer forced to make a quick decision as 
the appropriate course of action to take to preserve his or her safety and the safety of 
others." Collins, 847 P.2d at 922. Thus, under a totality of the circumstances, where the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was armed and dangerous, 
Officer Olsen's question as to whether defendant possessed any weapons was justified. 
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 ("When an officer is justified in believing that the individual 
whose suspicions behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or other, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the 
officer the power to take necessary measures to . . . neutralize the threat of physical 
harm."). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
Dated this */ " day of October, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IY T. COLEMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
WEAPONS 
76-10-501. Definitions. 
As used in this part 
(1) (a) "Antique firearm" means any firearm* 
(i) (A) with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar 
type of ignition system; and 
(B) that was manufactured in or before 1898; or 
(ii) that is a replica of any firearm described in this Subsection 
(lXa), if the replica: 
(A) is not designed or redesigned for using rimfire or 
conventional centerfire fixed ammunition; or 
(B) uses rimfire or centerfire fixed ammunition which is: 
(I) no longer manufactured in the United States; and 
(II) is not readily available in ordinary channels of 
commercial trade; or 
(iii) (A) that is a muzzle loading rifle, shotgun, or pistol; and 
(B) is designed to use black powder, or a black powder 
substitute, and cannot use fixed ammunition, 
(b) "Antique firearm" does not include: 
(i) any weapon that incorporates a firearm frame or receiver, 
(ii) any firearm that is converted into a muzzle loading 
weapon; or 
(iii) any muzzle loading weapon that can be readily converted 
to fire fixed ammunition by replacing the: 
(A) barrel; 
(B) bolt; 
(C) breechblock; or 
(D) any combination of Subsection UXbXiiiXA), (B), or (C). 
(2) (a) Concealed dangerous weapon* means a dangerous weapon that 
is covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not 
be aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use. 
(b) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a concealed dan-
gerous weapon if it is a firearm which is unloaded and is securely 
encased. 
(3) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background 
check conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a 
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where 
the firearms dealer conducts business. 
(4) "Curio or relic firearm" means any firearm that: 
(a) is ofspecial interest to a collector because ofa quality that is not 
associated with firearms intended for 
(i) sporting use; 
(ii) use as an offensive weapon; or 
(iii) use as a defensive weapon; 
(b) (i) was manufactured at least 50 years prior to the current 
date; and 
(ii) is not a replica ofa firearm described in Subsection (4XbXi); 
(c) is certified by the curator of a municipal, state, or federal 
museum that exhibits firearms to be a curio or relic of museum 
interest; 
(d) derives a substantial part of its monetary value: 
(i) from the fact that the firearm is: 
(A) novel; 
(B) rare; or 
(C) bizarre; or 
(ii) because of the firearm's association with an historical: 
(A) figure; 
(B) period; or 
(C) event; and 
(e) has been designated as a curio or relic firearm by the director of 
the United States Treasury Department Bureau of Alcohol, Tbbacco, 
and Firearms under 27 C PR Seo 17ft 11 
\uj \ay x^aiigciuuo w^ayvu uieaua cuijr iwui uuaw UJL uic manner ui ito 
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. The following factors shall be used in determining whether a 
knife, or any other item, object, or thing not commonly known as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was 
used; and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, 
or thing may be used, 
(b) "Dangerous weapon* does not include any explosive, chemical, 
or incendiary device as defined by Section 76-10-306. 
(6) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under crimes and 
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling, 
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a 
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise. 
(7) "Division* means the Criminal Investigations and Technical Ser-
vices Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section 
53-10-103. 
(8) "Enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(9) (a) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, 
rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous 
weapon from which is expelled a projectile by action of an explosive. 
(b) As used in Sections 76-10-626 and 76-10-627, "firearm" does not 
include an antique firearm. 
(10) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form created by the 
division to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a 
handgun from a dealer in the state. 
(11) "Fully automatic weapon" means any firearm which fires, is de-
signed to fire, or can be readily restored to fire, automatically more than 
one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger. 
(12) <a) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm of any 
description, loaded or unloaded, from which any shot, bullet, or other 
missile can be discharged, the length of which, not including any 
revolving, detachable, or magazine breech, does not exceed 12 inches. 
(b) As used in Sections 76-10-620,76-10-521, and 76-10-622, "hand-
gun" and "pistol or revolver" do not include an antique firearm. 
(13) "House of worship" means a church, temple, synagogue, mosque, or 
other building set apart primarily for the purpose of worship in which 
religious services are held and the main body of which is kept for that use 
and not put to any other use inconsistent with its primary purpose. 
(14) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawfiil to dis-
charge a firearm. 
(15) "Readily accessible for immediate use* means that a firearm or 
other dangerous weapon is carried on the person or within such close 
proximity and in such a manner that it can be retrieved and used as 
readily as if carried on the person. 
(16) "Residence" means an improvement to real property used or 
occupied as a primary or secondary residence. 
(17) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-off rifle" means a shotgun having a 
barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 indies in length, or in the case of a rifle, 
•having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any 
dangerous weapon made from a rU|p or shotgun by alteration, modifica-
tion, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has an overall length of fewer 
than 26 inches. 
(18) "Securely encased" means not readily accessible for immediate use, 
such as held in a gun rack, or in a closed case or container, whether or not 
locked, or in a trunk or other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including 
a glove box or console box. 
(19) "State entity" means each department, commission, board, council, 
agency, institution, officer, corporation, fund, division, office, committee, 
authority, laboratory, library, unit, bureau, panel, or other administrative 
unit of the state. 
(20) "Violent felony" means the same as defined in Section 76-3-203.5. 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon — Pen-
alties. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3): 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in 
Section 76-10-501, which is not a firearm on his person or one that is 
readily accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as 
defined in this part, in a place other than his residence, property, or 
business under his control is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; and 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a 
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no 
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains 
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a sawed-off rifle 
is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a violent felony as 
defined in Section 76-3-203.5, and the person is a party to the ofifense, the 
person is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful 
taking of protected or unprotected wildlife as defined in Title 23, Wildlife 
Resources Code, firom carrying a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm with 
a barrel length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of wildlife does 
not occur 
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of that municipality's 
ordinances; or 
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 41-6-1. 
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Defendant was indicted for possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 
manufacturing methamphetamine, and possession of 
a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking 
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(2) Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a traffic 
stop based on probable cause must be judged by 
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Before TACHA, Chief Judge, and SEYMOUR, 
BRORBY, EBEL, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE, 
LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 
ON REHEARING EN BANC 
PER CURIAM [FN*] 
FN* Parts I and II of Judge Ebel's opinion 
represent the en banc opinion of this court 
with the exception of a caveat noted in 
Judge Henry's concurrence. Parts I and II 
of Judge Briscoe's opinion also represent 
the en banc opinion of this court. Part EQ 
of Judge Ebel's opinion represents only the 
opinion of Chief Judge Tacha and Judges 
Brorby, Ebel, and Kelly. Parts III and IV 
of Judge Briscoe's opinion represent only 
the opinion of Judges Seymour, Briscoe, 
Lucero, and Murphy. Judge Henry has 
filed a separate concurrence joining Parts I 
and II of Judge Ebel's opinion with a 
caveat and Parts I and II of Judge Briscoe's 
opinion. Judge Kelly has filed a separate 
opinion joining Judge Ebel's opinion. 
Judge Lucero, joined by Judge Seymour, 
has filed a separate opinion joining Judge 
Briscoe's opinion. Judge Murphy has filed 
a separate opinion joining Judge Briscoe's 
opinion. 
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After a divided panel affirmed the district court's 
suppression of evidence obtained during a search of 
the defendant's car incident to a traffic stop, see 
United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931 (10th Cir.2000) 
, this court granted rehearing en banc on the 
following questions: (1) whether the Fourth 
Amendment constrains the scope, as well as the 
duration, of a traffic stop, and (2) whether an officer 
conducting a traffic stop may ask the driver about 
the presence of weapons in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion that the driver is armed and 
dangerous. Consistent with the panel opinion, a 
majority of this court concludes that the analytical 
framework set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), applies to 
traffic stops, and that Terry requires an analysis of 
both the scope and duration of a stop to determine 
whether the stop comports with the Fourth 
Amendment. In contrast to the original panel 
opinion, however, a majority of this court concludes 
that an officer conducting a traffic stop may ask the 
driver about the presence of loaded weapons in the 
absence of particularized suspicion of the existence 
of such firearms. 
As a result, we VACATE the panel opinion, 
REVERSE the district court's suppression orders 
and REMAND the case to the district court for 
further proceedings, consistent with Parts I and II of 
Judge Ebel's opinion (subject to the caveat 
contained in Judge Henry's concurrence) and Parts I 
and II of Judge Briscoe's opinion. 
EBEL, Circuit Judge. [FN**] 
FN** Parts I and II of this opinion are 
joined by Chief Judge Tacha and Judges 
Brorby, Kelly and Henry (subject to a 
caveat noted in Judge Henry's 
concurrence). Thus, Parts I and II 
represent the majority opinion of the en 
banc court, subject to Judge Henry's caveat. 
We granted en banc rehearing in this case to 
delineate the scope of permissible questioning 
during a routine traffic stop. We hold that the 
officer's question about the existence of a loaded 
weapon in the vehicle was justified on the grounds 
of officer safety. During a routine traffic stop, an 
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officer may ask the stopped motonst *1218 whether 
there is a loaded firearm in the car even in the 
absence of particularized suspicion of the existence 
of such a firearm. The objective safety risks to 
officers during routine traffic stops in general have 
led courts to approve reasonable steps to insure 
officer safety, including asking the driver and 
passengers of a stopped car to exit the vehicle and 
conducting routine cnminal history checks. These 
safety risks also justify limited questions about the 
presence of loaded weapons. Thus, we reverse the 
suppression of the answer given as to the presence 
of a loaded weapon in the vehicle and remand for 
further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND [FN1] 
FN1. Many of the details of this traffic 
stop are sel forth in the original panel 
opinion, United States v Holt, ll<} F.3d 
931 (10th Cu\2000). 
On the evening of September 15, 1999, officers 
from the Muldrow, Oklahoma police department, 
accompanied by Damon Tucker, an Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol officer, established a driver's 
license checkpoint on Treat Road within the city 
limits of Muldrow The admitted impetus for 
establishing a checkpoint at this location was the 
officers' suspicion that the defendant, Dennis Holt, 
who lived in the area, was transporting illegal drugs 
along Treat Road. [FN2] 
FN2 Holt did not fully challenge the 
legality of the checkpoint below. We 
merely note, without drawing any 
conclusions, that City of Indianapolis v 
Edmond. 531 US. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 
LEd.2d 333 (2000), was decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States after 
the district: court ruling in this case. 
Although Holt asserts an Edmond 
challenge m his Supplemental Bnef, we do 
not believe the factual record is sufficiently 
developed to reach the issue. The parties 
remain free to address Edmond on remand. 
At the checkpoint, the officers stopped all vehicles 
Copr © West 2002 No Claim 
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traveling along Treat Road and checked all drivers1 
licenses. At approximately 10*30 pm., Tucker 
observed a Ford Ranger truck approach the 
checkpoint. Tucker noted that die driver of the 
truck, defendant Holt, was not wearing a seatbelt. 
After asking to see Holt's driver's license, Tucker 
asked Holt why he was not wearing a seatbelt. Holt 
stated that he lived in the area and pointed toward 
his house. At some point thereafter, officers from 
the Muldrow police department informed Tucker 
that Holt was the person they were seeking. Tucker 
asked Holt to pull over to the side of die road, exit 
his vehicle, and join Tucker m his patrol car. 
After Holt got mto the patrol car, Tucker asked for 
Holt's driver's license and proceeded to write a 
warning for the seatbelt violation. While doing so, 
Tucker asked Holt if "there was anything in [Holt's] 
vehicle [that Tucker] should know about such as 
loaded weapons." According to Tucker, he asks 
that question "on a lot of [his] stops." Holt stated 
there was a loaded pistol behind the passenger seat 
of his vehicle. Holt did not indicate whether he had 
a permit to carry a loaded gun (Oklahoma law 
requires a person carrying a permitted weapon 
immediately to disclose that fact when stopped by 
an officer), and Tucker did not ask whether Holt 
possessed such a permit Tucker then asked Holt if 
"there was anything else that [Tucker] should know 
about in the vehicle." Holt stated, "I know what 
you are referring to" but "I don't use them 
anymore." Upon further questioning by Tucker, 
Holt indicated that he had previously used drugs, 
but "hadn't been involved with them in about a year 
or so." At that point, Tucker asked Holt for consent 
to search his vehicle. Holt agreed. The district 
court found that Tucker had not yet issued the 
warning to Holt for the seatbelt violation at that 
point, and it is *1219 undisputed that Tucker still 
had Holt's driver's license in his possession during 
all the above-outlined questioning. According to 
Tucker, approximately three to four minutes elapsed 
between the tune he and Holt got into the patrol car 
and the time Holt consented to the search of his 
vehicle. 
Tucker and Holt then got out of the patrol car and 
Tucker again asked Holt if diere was anything else 
in the vehicle. Holt responded that the gun was all 
Tucker would find. Tucker proceeded to search the 
cab of the truck and found a loaded pistol behind 
the passenger seat. One of the Muldrow police 
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officers, when informed by Tucker that Holt had 
given consent to have his vehicle searched, began 
looking through the camper shell on the back of the 
truck. During the course of his search, this officer 
found a small bag containing spoons, syringes, 
loose matches, and two small baggies of a white 
powdery substance. Based upon the discovery of 
this evidence, Tucker arrested Holt and transported 
him to the Muldrow jail. 
Shortly after Holt's arrest, Tucker contacted an 
assistant district attorney for Sequoyah County 
regarding the possibility of obtaining a search 
warrant for Holfs residence based upon the 
evidence recovered from Holt's vehicle. The 
assistant district attorney concluded the evidence 
was not sufficient to support a search warrant for 
Holt's residence. He did, however, advise Tucker to 
utilize "a knock and talk" technique. In accordance 
with this advice, police officers went to Holfs 
residence, and Holt's mother gave verbal consent to 
search the premises. During the search, officers 
found chemical glassware in a room where Holt 
stayed, as well as drugs and various drug-making 
equipment m an outbuilding. 
Holt was indicted on October 14, 1999, on two 
counts of possession of methamphetamine with 
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) 
, one count of manufacturing methamphetamine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and one count of 
possession of a firearm in connection with a drug 
trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
. Holt moved to suppress his responses to Tucker's 
questions and the evidence seized from his vehicle. 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on 
the motion at which both Tucker and Holt testified. 
The district court subsequently issued a written 
order granting the motion to suppress. Shortly 
thereafter, Holt filed a supplemental motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his residence. 
That motion was granted by the district court 
pursuant to the government's concession that 
evidence obtained from the house should be 
suppressed if evidence obtained from the car was 
suppressed. [FN3] The government now brings an 
interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of 
the loaded gun, the drug paraphernalia found in the 
car and at the residence, andHolt's statements 
acknowledging his possession of a loaded gun and 
his prior drug use. 
FN3. Because the search of the house was 
predicated on consent by Holt's mother, it 
is not apparent from the record before us 
why the evidence obtained from the search 
necessarily had to be suppressed if the 
evidence obtained from the search of the 
car was suppressed. However, for the 
purpose of this appeal we accept the 
government's concession in that regard. If 
appropriate, this matter can be explored 
upon remand. 
DISCUSSION 
[1][2] In reviewing a district court order granting a 
motion to suppress, we accept the district court's 
factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
those findings. United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 
1240, 1243 (10th Cir.2001). We review *1220 de 
novo the ultimate determination of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness. Id. 
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
[3][4] The Fourth Amendment protects individuals 
from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. 
Const, amend. IV. "A traffic stop is a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief." United States v. 
Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) 
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 
99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always the reasonableness in all 
the circumstances of the particular invasion of a 
citizen's personal security. Reasonableness, of 
course, depends on a balance between the public 
interest and the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers. 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 
S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 
950, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) ("[W]e balance the 
privacy-related and law enforcement-related 
concerns to determine if the intrusion was 
reasonable."); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 
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116, 106 SCt. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) 
(balancing "the need to search or seize against the 
invasion which the search or seizure entails" 
(brackets omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U S at 21, 
88 S.Ct. 1868)) We generally disfavor bright-line 
rules in the Fourth Amendment context, relying 
instead on this basic balancing test. See Ohio v 
Robmette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 
L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); United States v Broomfield, 
201 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir2000), cert, denied, 
531 U S 830, 121 S Ct. 82, 148 L.Ed.2d 44 (2000). 
No one factor is determinative in this analysis; 
instead, reasonableness is "measured in objective 
terms by examining the totality of the 
circumstances" Robmette, 519 US. at 39, 117 
S.Ct. 417 In considering the indmdual-nghts side 
of the balance, we consider the individual's 
reasonable expectations of pnvacy and liberty. See 
Romo v Champion, 46 F3d 1013, 1018 (10th 
Cir.1995); United States v Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 
1063 (10th Or 1993); United States v 
Mesa-Rmcon, 911 F i d 1433,1442(10thCir. 1990). 
[5] We have consistently applied the principles of 
Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20 
LEA2d 889 (1968), to routine traffic stops. See, 
eg, United States v Botero-Osptna, 71 F3d 783, 
788 (10th Or. 1995) (en banc). Under Terry, the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on 
"whether the officer's action was justified at its 
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." 392 U.S. at 20, 88 
S Ct 1868 Thus, we assess the reasonableness of a 
traffic stop based on an observed violation by 
considering the scope of the officer's actions and 
balancing the motorist's legitimate expectation of 
pnvacy against the government's law-enforcement-
related interests. 
For example, when stopped for a traffic violation, a 
motonst expects "to spend a short period of time 
answering questions and waiting while the officer 
checks his license and registration." Berkemer v 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S.Ct 3138, 82 
LEd2d 317 (1984). At the same time, the 
government has a strong interest in ensuring that 
motorists comply with traffic laws. See Whren v. 
United States 517 US. 806, 818, 116 SCt. 1769, 
135 LEd.2d 89 (1996) (noting the "usual rule that 
probable cause to believe the law has been M221 
broken 'outbalances' private interest in avoiding 
police contact"). Thus, it is beyond dispute that an 
officer may ask questions relating to the reason for 
the stop. Ordinarily, this also includes questions 
relating to the motorist's travel plans. See, eg, 
United States v. West, 219 F3d 1171, 1176 (10th 
Cir.2000); United States v Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 
1263 (10th Cir.1989); United States v Hill, 195 
F 3d 258, 268 (6th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 
1176, 120 S.Ct. 1207, 145 L.Ed.2d 1110 (2000); 
United States v $404,905 00, 182 F 3d 643, 647 
(8th Cir. 1999). Travel plans typically are related to 
the purpose of a traffic stop because the motonst is 
traveling at the time of the stop. For example, a 
motorist's travel history and travel plans may help 
explain, or put mto context, why the motonst was 
weaving (if tired) or speeding (if there was an 
urgency to the travel). See, eg, United States v 
Barahona, 990 F.2d 412,416 (8th Cir. 1993). 
[6] It is also well established that an officer may ask 
about the dnver's authonty to operate the vehicle. 
Thus, we have repeatedly stated that during a 
routine traffic stop the officer may ask to see a 
dnver's license and registration and check that they 
are vahd. See, e.g, United States v Caro, 248 F.3d 
1240,1244 (10th Cir .2001). 
[7][8] On the other hand, motorists ordinarily 
expect to be allowed to continue on their way once 
the purposes of a stop are met See Berkemer, 468 
US. at 437, 104 S.Ct 3138. The government's 
general interest in criminal investigation, without 
more, is generally insufficient to outweigh the 
individual interest in ending the detention Thus, 
once the motorist has "produced a valid license and 
proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must 
be allowed to proceed on his way, without being 
subject to further delay by police for additional 
questioning." United States v Guzman, 864 F2d 
1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988), overruled on other 
grounds by Botero-Ospima, 71 F 3d at 785 Further 
delay is justified only if the officer has reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity or if the encounter has 
become consensual. Hunmcutt, 135 F 3d at 1349. 
II. QUESTIONS ABOUT LOADED WEAPONS 
[9] As with questions about the observed violation 
and the dnver's authonty to operate the vehicle, a 
motonst expects an officer to take reasonable 
measures to protect officer safety dunng the stop 
When these measures are not too intrusive, the 
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government's strong interest in officer safety 
outweighs the motorist's interests. Thus, for 
example, the motorist may be detained for a short 
period while the officer runs a background check to 
see if there are any outstanding warrants or criminal 
history pertaining to the motorist even though the 
purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such 
prior criminal history. The justification for 
detaining a motorist to obtain a criminal history 
check is, in part, officer safety. See, e.g., United 
States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1535 n. 6 (10th 
Cir.1996) ("Triple I checks are run largely to 
protect the officer. Considering the tragedy of the 
many officers who are shot during routine traffic 
stops ..., the almost simultaneous computer check of 
a person's criminal record ... is reasonable and 
hardly intrusive."); United States v. Purcell, 236 
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.2001) ("The request for 
criminal histories as part of a routine computer 
check is justified for officer safety."); United States 
v. Finite. 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir.1996) ("The 
results of a criminal history check could indicate 
whether further back-up or other safety precautions 
were necessary."). By determining whether a 
detained motorist has a criminal record or *1222 
outstanding warrants, an officer will be better 
apprized of whether the detained motorist might 
engage in violent activity during the stop. 
[10][11] An officer also may order the driver and 
passengers out of the vehicle in the interest of 
officer safety, even in the absence of any 
particularized suspicion of personal danger. 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 
882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct 330, 54 
L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). While a motorist retains some 
reasonable expectation of privacy when officer 
safety is at stake, cf Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 
113, 117, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) 
(rejecting the argument that officer safety justifies a 
full fie Id-type search during a routine traffic stop), 
the motorist's expectations are necessarily 
diminished. 
[12] In this case, Holt's reasonable expectations of 
pnvacy are even lower with respect to his concealed 
weapon. Under Oklahoma law, it is 
unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to 
identify the fact that the person is in actual 
possession of a concealed handgun pursuant to 
the authority of the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act 
Copr. © West 2002 No < 
when the person first comes into contact with any 
law enforcement officer ... during the course of 
any ... routine traffic stop. 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1290.8(C). Holt testified 
at the suppression hearing that he did not have a 
concealed-handgun permit. Thus, he was not under 
this statutory obligation to volunteer the presence of 
the gun when he was stopped. The above-quoted 
statute nevertheless remains relevant to determining 
reasonable expectations of privacy in Oklahoma. 
Oklahomans who lawfully possess concealed 
weapons have no expectation of privacy that society 
would recognize as reasonable in the fact that they 
are carrying concealed weapons, because they are 
required by law to disclose that fact. It would make 
little sense for Oklahoma society nevertheless to 
recognize as reasonable the privacy expectations of 
those who illegally possess concealed weapons in 
not revealing that information. Holt therefore had 
no reasonable expectation (that is, no expectation 
that Oklahoma society would recognize as 
reasonable) of keeping private the fact he was 
carrying a loaded weapon behind the passenger seat 
of his vehicle. Cf. United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 
115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir.1997) (a driver has no 
expectation of privacy in the Vehicle Identification 
Number due to the federal requirement that it be 
located in plain view). 
While the individual-privacy-interests side of the 
Fourth Amendment balancing is weaker in this 
context, the governmental-interests side is much 
stronger. The Supreme Court has found it "too 
plain for argument" that the government's interest in 
officer safety is "both legitimate and weighty," 
given the "inordinate risks confronting an officer as 
he approaches a person seated in an automobile." 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330. Other 
courts have also recognized that "[l]aw enforcement 
officials literally risk their lives each time they 
approach occupied vehicles during the course of 
investigative traffic stops." United States v. 
Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 978 (4th Cir.1997); see 
also McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536 n. 6 (noting the 
"tragedy of the many officers who are shot during 
routine traffic stops each year"). 
In Maryland v. Wilson the Supreme Court noted 
that in 1994 alone, 5,762 officers were assaulted 
and 11 were killed during traffic pursuits and stops. 
519 U.S. at 413, 117 S.Ct. 882 (citing Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: 
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Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 71, 
33 (1994)). Thirty percent M223 of police 
shootings occurred when a police officer 
approached a suspect seated in an automobile, and " 
'a significant percentage of murders of police 
officers occurs when die officers are making traffic 
stops.' " Mmms. 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330 ( 
quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
234, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). The 
most recent data reveal that in 1999, 6,048 officers 
were assaulted during traffic pursuits and stops and 
8 were killed. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers 
Killed and Assaulted 82, 28 (1999). More than 
34% of those assaults involved a dangerous weapon 
such as a gun or knife. Id. at 83. Firearms were 
used to commit 82 of the 94 killings of law 
enforcement officers during traffic pursuits and 
stops during the 1990s. Id. at 34. 
The terrifying truth is that officers face a very real 
risk of being assaulted with a dangerous weapon 
each time they stop a vehicle. The officer typically 
has to leave his vehicle, thereby exposing himself to 
potential assault by the motorist The officer 
approaches the vehicle not knowing who the 
motorist is or what the motorist's intentions might 
be. It is precisely during such an exposed stop that 
the courts have been willing to give the officers 
"wide latitude," Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978, to 
discern the threat the motorist may pose to officer 
safety. 
An officer in today's reality has an objective, 
reasonable basis to fear for his or her life every time 
a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is 
a confrontation. The motorist must suspend his or 
her plans and anticipates receiving a fine and 
perhaps even a jail term. That expectation becomes 
even more real when the motorist or a passenger 
knows there are outstanding arrest warrants or 
current criminal activity that may be discovered 
during the course of the stop. Resort to a loaded 
weapon is an increasingly plausible option for many 
such motorists to escape those consequences, and 
the officer, when stopping a car on a routine traffic 
stop, never knows in advance which motorists have 
that option by virtue of possession of a loaded 
weapon in the car. 
In balancing the interests in this case, we are 
guided by other situations in which federal courts 
have allowed considerations of officer safety to 
outweigh fairly intrusive conduct during a traffic 
stop. Thus, during a routine traffic stop, an officer 
may order the driver and passengers out of the 
vehicle, Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330; 
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415, 117 S.Ct. 882; order the 
passengers to remain in the vehicle, Rogala v. 
District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 53 
(D.C.Cir.1998); open the door of a vehicle with 
darkly tinted windows to check for weapons, 
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 981; order the occupants to 
raise their hands during the stop, United States v. 
Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 13 (3d Cir.1997); and use 
a flashlight to check the dark interior of a car, Texas 
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 
L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
In addition to information about loaded weapons 
that die officer may obtain from visually looking in 
the car, shining a light around the interior of the car, 
or asking the motorist and occupants to step out of 
die car or to keep their hands raised-all procedures 
authorized by the courts in the name of officer 
safety-an officer may also obtain information about 
the existence of a loaded weapon by simply asking 
the motorist if there is a loaded weapon in the 
vehicle. Indeed, straightforwardly asking this 
question is often less intrusive than many of the 
procedures authorized by our sister circuits. 
If a motorist volunteers that there is a loaded 
weapon in the car, that will undeniably *1224 be an 
important piece of information causing the officer 
to proceed with greater caution. It was suggested 
during oral argument in the en banc rehearing that a 
motorist with a loaded gun is unlikely to admit that 
fact. The facts of this case somewhat belie that 
argument Here, when asked that question, Holt 
freely admitted the presence of a loaded gun. Other 
cases present similar situations in which defendants 
either volunteered or trothfully responded that they 
possessed weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 
155 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. 
Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.1998); 
United States v. Maza, 93 F.3d 1390, 1395 (8th 
Cir.1996); United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 
325, 326 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc); Burris v. State, 
330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209, 211 (1997); State v. 
Hill, 254 Neb. 460, 577 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1998). 
Even in those cases where the motorist falsely 
denies the presence of a loaded gun, allowing the 
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officer to ask the question may provide important 
clues pertaining to safety. Officers have become 
skilled at detecting nervous or evasive responses 
from which the officer may gain valuable clues 
about a motorist's intentions. Thus, even a denial 
may alert the officer that the denial may not be 
truthful and thus that the officer should take greater 
care. 
A third possibility is that the motorist may decline 
to answer the question. That, too, conveys 
information relevant to the officer's personal safety. 
Although nothing compels the motorist to answer 
such a question, when a motorist declines to answer 
it, the officer may draw clues from that declination 
that he or she should be more prudent and 
concerned about personal safety. The officer may 
not use the refusal to answer as the basis for a more 
intrusive search, but the officer would certainly be 
pennitted to use that information to justify prudent 
safety-related measures. 
Thus, any response the officer receives in response 
to this question will be helpful in appraising the risk 
presented more accurately. We therefore conclude 
that allowing officers to ask about the presence of 
loaded weapons in a lawfully stopped vehicle will 
promote die government's "legitimate and weighty" 
interest in officer safety. 
If a motorist offers a voluntary response to a 
question regarding the presence of a loaded gun, the 
response could be used just like any other voluntary 
admission made during a traffic stop. If the 
admission reveals a crime the officer can act 
accordingly, as is always the case when the officer 
is aware of a crime taking place. If the motorist 
declines to answer the question, however, the 
officer could not, in the absence of particularized 
suspicion, take any legal action (other than 
reasonable actions for personal safety) based on that 
refusal. Because it is within a motorist's right to 
refuse to answer, ordinarily no inference of guilt 
can be drawn from that refusal and any further 
detention must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. Cf. Berkemer, 468 
U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138 C[T]he detainee is 
not obligated to respond. And, unless the detainee's 
answers provide the officer with probable cause to 
arrest him, he must then be released." (footnotes 
omitted)); Terry, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868 
(White, J., concurring) ("Of course, the person 
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stopped is not obligated to answer, answers may not 
be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no 
basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer 
to the need for continued observation."). 
Although Holt was not in his vehicle when Officer 
Tucker asked about loaded weapons, this does not 
eviscerate the safety rationale for the question. By 
ordering *1225 Holt to sit in the patrol car during 
the stop, Tucker had temporarily neutralized the 
risk posed by a weapon in Holt's vehicle. But with 
the stop nearing completion, Officer Tucker 
reasonably expected that Holt was about to return to 
his vehicle and once again would have access to any 
weapons in it It was at this point that Tucker asked 
about loaded weapons in the vehicle, and the safety 
rationale is plain. The Supreme Court has held that 
the entire interior of a vehicle is treated as within a 
motorist's immediate control and therefore falls 
within the scope of a search incident to arrest, even 
after the motorist has been ordered out of the 
vehicle and placed under arrest. New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 
(1981). A search incident to arrest is justified in 
part on the basis of officer safety. Id. at 457, 101 
S.Ct. 2860. If die interior of the vehicle is relevant 
to officer safety in a case like Belton, where the 
arrestee is unlikely to return to the vehicle, then it is 
all the more so relevant here, where the motorist is 
almost certain to return. 
[13] We emphasize also that the balance does not 
depend on whether the officer subjectively fears the 
motorist [FN4] Subjective intentions rarely play a 
role in Fourth Amendment analysis. See Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13, 116 S.Ct. 
1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). In the context of 
officer safety in particular, die Supreme Court has 
relied on an objective view of the circumstances. 
See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117 
S.Ct 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (holding that 
objective circumstances during a traffic stop allow 
an officer to order a driver out of the car, 
"subjective thoughts notwithstanding"). Similarly, 
the availability of a "search incident to arrest" for 
officer safety does not depend on the subjective 
mindset of the arresting officer. United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 & n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 467, 
38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). As the Supreme Court has 
explained in the context of the "public safety" 
exception to Miranda warnings, 
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FN4. Holt cites Officer Tucker's testimony 
that he "d[id]n't remember feeling 
threatened" by Holt. We believe this 
statement may have been taken out of 
context. Tucker was discussing whether he 
had made a show of authority (e.g., 
touching his gun) while Holt was seated in 
the patrol car. Tucker said he did not 
because he had no reason to fear Holt at 
that time. Thus, Tucker's statement does 
not address whether he feared danger when 
Holt returned to his car, which is the 
relevant question, as noted above. The 
record is silent on the subjective fear 
question in the context of Holf s return to 
his own car, but in any event, the 
subjective question is not controlling. 
[T]he availability of [the public-safety] exception 
does not depend upon the motivation of the 
individual officers involved.... [It] should not be 
made to depend on post hoc findings at a 
suppression hearing concerning the subjective 
motivation of the arresting officers. 
Undoubtedly, most police officers ... would act 
out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely 
unverifiable motives—their own safety, the safety 
of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain 
incriminating evidence from the suspect. 
Whatever the motivation of individual officers in 
such a position, we do not believe the doctrinal 
underpinnings of Miranda require that it be 
applied in all its rigor to a situation in which 
police officers ask questions reasonably prompted 
by a concern for the public safety. 
New York v. Quarks, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56, 104 
S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (footnote 
omitted). That one officer is braver (or more 
foolhardy) than another, and therefore not 
subjectively concerned for his or her safety, should 
not deprive that particular officer of a right to 
protect his *1226 or her safety. Even the brave 
officer should be allowed to minimize the 
ever-present risk of being attacked or killed. 
Given the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, we 
hold that the government's interest in officer safety 
outweighs a motorist's interest in not being asked 
about the presence of loaded weapons. [FN5] This 
balance tips in the government's favor even when 
the officer lacks particularized suspicion that the 
motonst possesses loaded weapons and regardless 
of whether the officer subjectively fears the 
motorist. Accordingly, the district court erred in 
suppressing Holt's response to this question. 
FN5. This case involves only a simple 
question about the presence of a loaded 
gun in a vehicle during a routine traffic 
stop. We do not in this case attempt to 
address other situations where the balance 
might come out differently. Of course, any 
questioning that unreasonably extends the 
duration of the stop must be justified by 
additional articulable suspicion or 
probable cause. 
There are surprisingly few cases addressing this 
question in other jurisdictions, but the several 
federal circuit cases confronting this issue seem 
generally to support our conclusion. See, e.g., 
Maza, 93 F.3d at 1396- 97 (finding "nothing 
improper'* in an officer's questioning whether there 
were guns in a truck, although without any 
discussion of the constitutional issues); United 
States v. Afoy, No. 98-3113, 1999 WL 1215651, at 
*3 (D.C.Cir. Nov.8, 1999)- (unpublished) 
("Certainly ... the Fourth Amendment ... permits an 
officer to ask simply whether a driver has a gun."), 
cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1011, 120 S.Ct. 1284, 146 
L.Ed.2d 231 (2000). [FN6] 
FN6. In United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 
1034, 1039 (10th Cir.1996), we found an 
officer's question about firearms during a 
routine traffic stop was "unrelated to his 
underlying justification for the detention." 
That case did not address an officer-safety 
justification for the question; however, to 
the extent Lew or any of our other 
precedent conflict with the rule we 
announce today, we expressly overrule 
them. 
III. QUESTIONS NOT RELATED TO OFFICER 
SAFETY [¥W] 
FN7. This Part III represents only the 
views of Chief Judge Tacha and Judges 
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Brorby, Ebel, and Kelly. 
Officer Tucker's first question to Holt was whether 
there was anything in the vehicle Tucker should 
know about, such as loaded weapons. As explained 
above, this question was justified by considerations 
of officer safety. The district court therefore erred 
in suppressing Holfs response to this question. The 
district court also suppressed Holt's responses to the 
subsequent questioning and the evidence seized 
during the searches of the vehicle and later the 
house, and the officer-safety rationale does not 
necessarily extend to these other matters. 
The government has asked for a broader rule that 
during a routine traffic stop, the officer may ask any 
questions so long as they do not lengthen the stop or 
transform it into a full custodial arrest. Cf. United 
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) 
("[Detention, not questioning, is the evil at which 
Terry *s second prong is aimed."). Under this rule, 
the government argues, all of Officer Tucker's 
questioning was appropriate and the suppression 
orders should be reversed in their entireties. 
Because the factual record is not sufficiently 
developed at present, however, I would decline to 
address this issue. I would find it more prudent to 
vacate the portions of the panel opinion in this case 
discussing the issue and to leave its resolution in 
this case for a later time after it is more fully 
developed factually. 
According to Officer Tucker's testimony at the 
suppression hearing, the following *1227 took 
place after Holt admitted he had a loaded weapon in 
his vehicle. Tucker asked if there was anything else 
he should know about in the vehicle, and Holt 
mentioned that he did not use drugs anymore. 
Tucker then questioned Holt further about his drug 
history and habits and finally asked for consent to 
search, which Holt gave. The total conversation 
was no more than three to four minutes. 
There are a number of unresolved issues that might 
affect our analysis of this questioning. First, it is 
somewhat unclear whether Officer Tucker raised 
the issue of drugs or whether Holt broached the 
topic on his own. Tucker's second question—if there 
was anything else he should know about in the 
vehicle- appears on its face to be an appropriate 
follow-up question to the one about weapons we 
Copr. © West 2002 No < 
have approved, and therefore might also be justified 
on the grounds of officer safety. In context, 
however, it might be seen as fishing for information 
about Holt's unrelated drug activity, which likely 
had no reasonable relationship to officer safety. 
Second, assuming that Holt raised the drug issue 
himself, it is unclear whether his response created a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would 
itself justify further detention and questioning. 
Third, the record does not resolve clearly whether 
the subsequent questioning lengthened the stop or 
whether all of it took place while Officer Tucker 
was preparing the warning. Finally, we cannot tell 
whether the questions about drugs, which did not 
prompt any incriminatory responses, had any effect 
on the subsequent course of action-in particular, 
whether they affected the requests for consent to 
search the vehicle and later the house. 
Given these uncertainties, I believe we could 
address the government's broader argument only as 
an abstract matter. We likely would not need to 
address the issue at all if, for example, Officer 
Tucker had reasonable suspicion to support his 
questions. See Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1349. It 
might also be unnecessary if Holfs consent to 
search the vehicle was untainted by any Fourth 
Amendment violation from the drug questions. See 
United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th 
Cir.1991). Rather than speculate about the 
constitutionality of further questioning in the 
abstract, I would remand to the district court to 
develop an adequate factual record. That court 
would also be able to rule on any remaining Fourth 
Amendment issues in the first instance. I would 
resolve the broader issues when they are framed 
appropriately and it is necessary to do so, whether 
in a later appeal in this case or in a more 
appropriate case. No. 99-7150, United States v. 
Holt 
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge: [FNI] 
FN1. Parts I and II of Judge Briscoe's 
opinion represent the en banc opinion of 
this court. Parts in and IV of Judge 
Briscoe's opinion represent only the 
opinion of Judges Seymour, Briscoe, 
Lucero, and Murphy. 
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We continue to adhere to the conclusions reached 
in the original panel opinion. First, we reject the 
government's primary en banc argument and 
conclude that both the length and scope of a traffic 
stop are relevant factors in deciding whether the 
stop comports with the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, we reject the government's request to adopt 
a bright-line rule allowing an officer conducting a 
traffic stop to ask a driver about the presence of 
loaded weapons in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion that the driver may be armed and 
dangerous. We would reverse the suppression order 
of the district court and remand with directions to 
the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether defendant *1228 Holfs consent 
to search his vehicle was tainted by the officer's 
improper questioning about weapons. 
I. 
In reviewing an order granting a motion to 
suppress, we accept the district court's factual 
findings unless clearly erroneous, review questions 
of law de novo, and view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party. See United 
States v. liland, 2:54 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th 
Cir.2001); United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 1240, 
1243 (10th Cir.2001). 
n. 
[14] The Fourth Amendment protects individuals 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. 
Const, amend. IV. "A traffic stop is a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 'even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief.' " United States v. 
Hunmcutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) 
(quoting Delaware v Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 
99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). Because a 
routine traffic stop is more analogous to an 
investigative detention than a custodial arrest, we 
have routinely analyzed such stops under the 
framework announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). E.g., 
Hunmcutt, 135 F.3d at 1348. Under Terry, we 
determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure 
by conducting a "dual inquiry, asking first 'whether 
the officer's action was justified at its inception,' and 
second 'whether it was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified the interference 
in the first place.' " Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The first prong of Terry is 
clearly satisfied in this case because there is no 
dispute that Tucker saw Holt driving without a 
seatbelt. Thus, our focus is on the second prong of 
the Terry inquiry, i.e., whether Tucker's questioning 
of Holt regarding the presence of weapons in his 
vehicle was reasonable. [FN2] 
FN2. We note at the outset that Holt was 
never asked any questions regarding his 
travel plans. Therefore, we do not address 
whether questions regarding travel plans 
are "reasonably related" to the scope of 
this or any stop. 
Citing a line of cases from other courts, most 
notably United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th 
Cir.1993), the government argues that during a 
traffic stop based on probable cause, length is the 
only constraint on questioning. The government 
argues that, as long as the officer's interrogation 
does not unreasonably extend the length of the stop, 
the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. In short, 
the government asks us to abandon the "scope" 
limitations of Terry and look only to the duration of 
the stop. In the government's view, the nature of the 
questions asked is immaterial to the Fourth 
Amendment, at least as long as it does not change 
the "fundamental character" of the seizure from a 
Terry stop to a full custodial arrest. [FN3] 
FN3. If the government were to retain any 
viability to the "scope" limitation of Terry 
it would only be in the ill-defined sense 
that the questioning could not become so 
intrusive as to change the fundamental 
character of the stop. 
In Shabazz, police officers stopped a vehicle for 
speeding. One officer asked die driver to get out of 
the vehicle and produce his driver's license. While 
the officer ran a computer check on the license, he 
asked the driver a series of questions about his 
recent whereabouts. During the same time period, a 
second officer posed similar questions to the 
driver's companion, who remained in the vehicle. 
After comparing notes and determining *1229 they 
had been given conflicting stones, the officers 
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sought and received consent to search the vehicle. 
Drugs were found inside the vehicle and both the 
driver and the occupant were charged and convicted 
on drug-related counts. On appeal, they argued that 
the officers exceeded the reasonable scope of the 
original purpose of die stop when they questioned 
them about their recent whereabouts. The Fifth 
Circuit rejected this argument. In doing so, the 
court "rejected] any notion that a police officer's 
questioning, even on a subject unrelated to the 
purpose of the stop, is itself a Fourth Amendment 
violation." 993 F.2d at 436. Further, the court 
noted that the questioning at issue "occurred while 
the officers were waiting for the results of the 
computer check" and thus "did nothing to extend 
the duration of the initial, valid seizure." Id. at 437. 
In sum, the Fifth Circuit effectively held that 
questioning by an officer, even on matters unrelated 
to the purpose of the detention itself, docs not cause 
a detention to become more intrusive unless the 
questioning extends the duration of the detention. 
We find the holding in Shabazz unpersuasive. 
[FN4] In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit 
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's statement in 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 
2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), that "mere police 
questioning does not constitute a seizure." The 
problem with this statement is that it was made by 
the Court in the course of determining whether 
random questioning of bus passengers by police 
constituted a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment (the Court ultimately determined such 
encounters are consensual and thus are not 
"seizures"). The Court did not address the issue 
posed in Shabazz and this case, i.e., whether, in the 
context of a nonconsensual police-citizen 
encounter, police questioning on matters unrelated 
to the purposes of the initial stop can be so intrusive 
as to violate the Fourth Amendment. [FN5] 
Although the Court has not directly addressed the 
issue we now face, it has, in applying the Terry 
analysis, routinely employed language indicating 
there are limitations on both the length of the 
detention and the manner in which it is carried out 
(what I refer to here as the "scope" or "breadth" of 
the detention). For example, in Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 
(1983), the Court emphasized that "the investigative 
methods employed should be the least intrusive 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the 
officer's suspicion in a short period of time." The 
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Court further emphasized it was the government's 
burden to demonstrate that an investigative 
detention "was sufficiently limited in scope and 
duration." Id. (emphasis added); see also Illinois v. 
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950, 148 
L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) ("[T]he restraint at issue was 
tailored to that need, being limited in time and 
scope.") (emphasis added); United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 690, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 
(1985) *1230 ("Even a stop that lasts no longer than 
necessary to complete the investigation for which 
the stop was made may amount to an illegal arrest if 
the stop is more than 'minimally intrusive.' ") 
(Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Hensley, 
469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed2d 604 
(1985) (emphasizing that both the "length and 
intrusiveness" of a stop are relevant for purposes of 
the Terry analysis). 
FN4. The Seventh Circuit recently rejected 
Shabazz as weU, characterizing it as the 
only circuit decision refusing to 
acknowledge that "when a police officer 
questions someone during a routine traffic 
stop, inquiries falling outside the scope of 
the detention constitute unlawful seizure." 
United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 
andn.l(7thCir.2001). 
FN5. Because Tucker had possession of 
Holfs driver's license, the questioning 
clearly occurred during a nonconsensual 
encounter between Tucker and Holt. See 
United States v. Mendezt 118 F.3d 1426, 
1430 (10th Cir.1997) ("[T]his circuit has 
consistently applied at least one bright-
line rule [in determining whether an officer 
and driver are engaged in a consensual 
encounter]: an officer must return a 
driver's documentation before the 
detention can end."). 
[15][16] We recognize that the Supreme Court has 
suggested in dictum that traffic stops based on 
probable cause might not be governed by Terry. See 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 
S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ("We of course 
do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by 
probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by 
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the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry 
stop."). We nonetheless reject the government's 
position and would adhere to our settled rule that a 
traffic stop should be analyzed under Terry, 
regardless of whether the stop is based on probable 
cause or on some lesser suspicion. Factually, most 
traffic stops are based on probable cause. Cf. 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 
S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("As a general 
matter, the decision to stop an automobile is 
reasonable where the police have probable cause to 
believe that a traffic violation has occurred."). 
Rarely do these stops lead to an arrest, however, 
even when arrest is authorized by statute. Cf. 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 
S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) ("[T]he 
country is not confronting anything like an epidemic 
of unnecessary minor- offense arrests."); Berkemer, 
468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (noting that during 
a traffic stop, a motorist expects to answer some 
questions and perhaps receive a citation, but "that in 
the end he most likely will be allowed to continue 
on his way"). As we have noted many times, a 
typical traffic stop resembles in character the 
investigative stop governed by Terry more closely 
than it does a custodial arrest E.g., United States v. 
Botero-Ospina, 71 FJd 783, 786 (10th Cir.1995) 
(en banc). We see no compelling reason to depart 
from this en banc court's previous holding that even 
if "an officer's initial traffic stop [is] objectively 
justified by the officer's observation of a minor 
traffic violation, ... his investigation nevertheless 
will be circumscribed by Terry 's scope 
requirement." Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 788.Even 
if we were to abandon Terry for this type of traffic 
stop, we are convinced we would still apply a scope 
requirement since, as indicated by the Supreme 
Court, the Fourth Amendment constrains the scope 
of all searches and seizures. E.g., Royer, 460 U.S. 
at 499-500, 103 S.Ct. 1319. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop based 
on probable cause must be judged by examining 
both the length of the detention and the manner in 
which it is carried out. We therefore reject the 
government's assertion that, because Officer 
Tucker's questioning about weapons did not extend 
the length of the stop in this case, there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation. 
III. 
The second issue we must address is whether to 
adopt a bright-line rule allowing an officer 
conducting a traffic stop to ask the driver about the 
presence of weapons, absent reasonable suspicion 
that the driver may be armed and dangerous. For 
the reasons that follow, I believe we should reject 
the government's invitation to adopt such a rule in 
this case. 
The "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis 
"is always 'the reasonableness in M231 all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental 
invasion of a citizen's personal security.' " 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 
S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terryf 
392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868). "Reasonableness, 
of course, depends 'on a balance between the public 
interest and the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers.' " Id. (quoting United States v. BrignonU 
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 
L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Because of "the fact-specific 
nature of the reasonableness inquiry," the Supreme 
Court has generally "eschewed bright-line rules" in 
the Fourth Amendment context. Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 
(1996). 
Consistent with this framework, officers 
conducting traffic stops may "take such steps as 
[are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal 
safety." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235, 105 S.Ct. 675. 
"For example, they may order out of a vehicle both 
the driver ... and any passengers," "perform a 
'patdown' of a driver and any passengers upon 
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and 
dangerous," "conduct a Terry patdown' of the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle upon 
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous 
and may gain immediate control of a weapon," and 
"even conduct a full search of the passenger 
compartment, including any containers therein, 
pursuant to a custodial arrest." Knowles v. Iowa, 
525 U.S. 113, 117-18, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 
492(1998). 
Applying the reasonableness inquiry in this case, 
"we look first to that side of the balance which 
bears the officer's interest in taking the action that 
he did." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109, 98 S.Ct. 330. It 
is important to emphasize at this point that the 
government has never attempted to argue, and 
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indeed cannot argue, that Officer Tucker reasonably 
suspected that Holt may have been armed and 
dangerous. At no time during the suppression 
hearing did Tucker testify that he believed Holt to 
be armed or otherwise dangerous, or that he was 
concerned for his safety; indeed, he testified that he 
did not "remember feeling threatened" by HoitApp. 
at 44. In granting Holt's motion to suppress, and in 
response to the government's argument that Officer 
Tucker was justified in his inquiry about the 
presence of weapons in Holt's vehicle to insure the 
officer's safety, the district court made the following 
factual findings, none of which the government or 
the majority has established are clearly erroneous: 
Trooper Tucker did not testify that he had any 
suspicion that Defendant was armed and 
dangerous to justify his question regarding the 
presence of firearms. Similarly, Trooper Tucker 
did not testify that he was subjectively in fear of 
his safety or apprehension of physical harm from 
Defendant. Objectively, Defendant was seated in 
Trooper Tucker's OHP cruiser, at a police traffic 
checkpoint, surrounded by additional police 
officers. These circumstances do not give rise to 
any apparent risk of harm to Trooper Tucker or 
any other officer that was present. As a result, 
this Court finds that officer safety could not and 
did not justify Trooper Tucker's questioning. 
Dist. Ct. Order at 7-8. 
Although Tucker's limited knowledge that Holt was 
a drug trafficking suspect perhaps could have 
afforded him with a reasonable suspicion that Holt 
was armed or dangerous, see, e.g., United States v. 
Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 864-65 (7th Cir.1999) 
(indicating that officer who stopped suspect for 
traffic violation had reasonable suspicion that 
suspect might be armed and dangerous due, in part, 
to officer's knowledge *1232 of FBI surveillance of 
the suspect's vehicle as a possible part of a 
large-scale drug operation), Tucker did not indicate 
this was the case, and there is no other evidence that 
would allow us to reach such a conclusion. 
Tucker's actions during the stop are also consistent 
with the conclusion that Holt did not represent a 
safety threat. For example, Tucker did not attempt 
to pat down Holt when he ordered him out of his 
vehicle. Further, the evidence indicates Tucker 
placed Holt in the patrol car because that was his 
routine practice with male detainees (although that 
routine practice may have originated out of safety 
concerns, there was no evidence on that point). 
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Finally, in seeking Holfs consent to search the 
vehicle, it appears that Tucker was not interested in 
locating the weapon for safety purposes, but rather 
was interested in determining if Holt had violated 
Oklahoma state law. App. at 42 (Tucker testified he 
was interested in checking the weapon to "make 
sure it [wa]s loaded or that there [wajs a violation," 
thereby allowing him to "issue a citation or take the 
subject into custody"). 
In lieu of reasonable suspicion, the government 
asks us to recognize that an officer faces significant 
dangers each time he or she conducts a traffic stop. 
In other words, the government asks us to adopt an 
approach similar to the one followed by the 
Supreme Court in Mimms and Wilson, two cases in 
which the Court was willing to announce bright-line 
rules governing traffic stops. 
In Mimms, two police officers on routine patrol 
observed an individual driving an automobile with 
an expired license plate. After stopping the vehicle 
for the purpose of issuing a citation, one of die 
officers ordered the driver out of the car and asked 
him to produce his driver's license. When the driver 
did so, the officer "noticed a large bulge under [the 
driver's] sports jacket" and, "[f]earing that the bulge 
might be a weapon, ... frisked [the driver] and 
discovered in his waistband a [loaded] 38-caliber 
revolver." 434 U.S. at 107, 98 S.Ct. 330. Although 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that it 
was constitutionally impermissible for the officer to 
order the driver out of the vehicle, the Supreme 
Court held otherwise. Despite the fact that "the 
officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the 
... driver at the time of the stop," the Court 
concluded that the officer nonetheless faced two 
specific safety risks. Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330. First, 
the Court emphasized "the inordinate nsk 
confronting an officer as he approaches a person 
seated in an automobile." Id. Second, the Court 
noted the potential "hazard of accidental injury 
from passing traffic to an officer standing on the 
driver's side of [a] vehicle." Id at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330. 
The Court ultimately concluded that these safety 
risks outweighed what it described as the "de 
minimis" intrusion on personal liberty caused by the 
officer asking the driver to get out of his vehicle. Id. 
In Wilson, a Maryland state trooper observed an 
automobile being driven over the posted speed limit 
and without a regular license tag. The trooper 
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pursued the car and, as he did so, observed two 
passengers in the vehicle, both of whom "turned to 
look at him several tunes, repeatedly ducking below 
sight level and then reappearing." 519 U.S. at 410, 
117 S.Ct. 882. When the vehicle finally stopped, the 
driver got out and met the trooper halfway. "The 
driver was trembhng and appeared extremely 
nervous, but nonetheless produced a valid 
Connecticut driver's license." Id. The trooper 
instructed the driver to return to the car and retrieve 
the rental documents, and the driver complied 
While the driver was sitting in the driver's seat 
looking for the rental papers, the trooper ordered 
the front-seat passenger, M233 who "was sweating 
and also appeared extremely nervous," out of the 
car. Id. at 410-11, 117 S.Ct. 882. When the 
passenger got out of the car, a quantity of crack 
cocaine fell to the ground, and the passenger was 
arrested and charged with possession with intent to 
distribute. Prior to trial, the passenger moved to 
suppress the evidence, arguing that it was 
constitutionally impermissible for the trooper to 
order him out of the vehicle. The Maryland courts 
agreed and suppressed the evidence. The Supreme 
Court, however, reversed, concluding that "the rule 
of Mimms applies to passengers as well as to 
drivers." Id. at 413, 117 S.Ct. 882. In doing so, the 
Court noted that the same dangers exist when an 
officer approaches a stopped vehicle, "regardless of 
whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver 
or passenger." Id. Although the Court 
acknowledged that "the danger of the officer's 
standing in the path of oncoming traffic would not 
be present except in the case of a passenger in the 
left rear seat," it emphasized that the presence of 
"more than one occupant of the vehicle increases 
the possible sources of harm to the officer." Id. 
In my view, Mimms and Wilson do not translate as 
readily to the circumstances of this case as the 
government suggests. To begin with, it is beyond 
obvious that the relative weight of the interest in 
officer safety will vary depending upon the 
particularcircumstances of each case. E.g., Knowles, 
525 U.S. at 117, 119 S.Ct. 484 ("The threat to 
officer safety from issuing a traffic citation ... is a 
good deal less than in the case of a custodial 
arrest."); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330 
(recognizing "the inordinate risk confronting an 
officer as he approaches a person seated in an 
automobile," as well as the "hazard of accidental 
injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on 
the driver's side of [a detained] vehicle"). Thus, in 
considering die reasonableness of specific police 
conduct we must focus sharply on the context in 
which die conduct occurred in order to identify the 
particular risk(s) posed to officer safety. 
Here, unlike Mimms and Wilson, we are not dealing 
with the beginning stages of a traffic stop. 
Therefore, we are not confronted with "the 
inordinate risk[s]" that exist when an officer 
approaches a "person seated in an automobile," or 
with the "hazard of accidental injury from passing 
traffic to an officer standing on the driver's side of 
[a stopped] vehicle." [FN6] Mimms, 434 U.S. at 
110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330. Our focus instead must be on 
the risks that Officer Tucker faced when he posed 
his question about loaded weapons, i.e., as Holt sat 
in the squad car while Tucker finished writing a 
warning for Holf s seatbelt violation. Viewed more 
genetically, we must determine what types of risks 
exist near the conclusion of a routine traffic stop, 
including those that exist when a driver is allowed 
to return to his car and leave the scene. 
FN6. The fact is that Officer Tucker 
considerably neutralized any such risks by 
ordering Holt out of his truck and into 
Tucker's vehicle. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 
111, 98 S.Ct. 330. 
On this point, the evidence is, to put it generously, 
quite meager. It is uncontroverted that Officer 
Tucker never broached the subject in his testimony 
during the suppression hearing, and the government 
never submitted any other evidence on this point to 
the district court. Thus, we are left with the 
government's citations to Mimms and Wilson, and a 
handful of general crime statistics independently 
uncovered by the majority. Although the majority 
is willing to afford great weight to its statistics, I am 
unwilling to do the same. In taking this stance, I 
acknowledge that the Supreme Court relied on 
M234 general crime statistics in Mimms and Wilson. 
That reliance is much more understandable in my 
view, however, since the Court in those cases was 
assessing the risks that exist at or near the outset of 
a traffic stop, when the driver and/or occupants are 
still in their vehicle and the outcome of the stop 
remains unknown. 
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Given the lack of real evidence, I am inclined to 
conclude that the safety risks existing at the 
conclusion of a routine traffic stop (i.e., one not 
ending in an arrest) are significantly lower than at 
the beginning of such a stop. I draw this 
conclusion, in part, from the Court's statement in 
Wilson "that the possibility of a violent encounter 
stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist 
stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact 
that evidence of a more serious crime might be 
uncovered during the stop." 519 U.S. at 414, 117 
S.Ct. 882. If, as here, a traffic stop is about to end 
with the mere issuance of a ticket or warning (or 
with no official action), then I submit the safety 
risks are low, since the driver will be less concerned 
at that point "that evidence of a more serious crime 
[will] be uncovered." [FN7] Id. 
FN7. For these same reasons, it is 
conceivable in my view that Officer 
Tucker's questioning about loaded 
weapons and other contraband actually 
increased, rather than reduced, any 
potential safety risks. 
I now turn to the second part of the reasonableness 
equation, which requires us to identify the 
individual interests that are implicated when an 
officer asks a driver about the presence of weapons. 
On this point, the majority curiously focuses only 
on the individual interests of defendant Holt, or 
more accurately, what it perceives as the 
nonexistent individual interests of defendant Holt 
Citing an Oklahoma statute that makes it "unlawful 
for any person to fail or refuse to identify the fact 
that [they are] in actual possession of a concealed 
handgun pursuant to the authority of the Oklahoma 
Self-Defense Act" when they come into contact 
with a law enforcement officer during a traffic stop, 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 21, § 1290.8(C), the majority 
suggests that Holt "had no reasonable expectation ... 
of keeping private the fact that he was carrying a 
loaded weapon behind the passenger seat of his 
vehicle." Maj. Op. at 1222. Although this analysis 
is quick and convenient, I question whether it is 
correct. The majority cites no cases in support of 
its proposition, and my own review of relevant 
Supreme Court cases suggests the majority's 
position is unprecedented. See generally Minnesota 
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 
L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("If 
the illegality of the activity made constitutional an 
otherwise unconstitutional search, such Fourth 
Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent 
only, would have little force in regulating police 
behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty."). 
If the majority's analysis were correct, then why 
wouldn't a similar conclusion be reached regarding 
a driver's possession of illegal drugs? In other 
words, because state and federal law make it illegal 
to possess various types of street drugs, then 
wouldn't a driver lack any reasonable expectation of 
keeping private the fact that he was carrying such 
drugs in his vehicle? Moreover, the majority's 
analysis ignores the broader view, including those 
situations where a driver is either lawfully carrying 
an item that could be brandished as a weapon, see 
generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1061, 
103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) ("An individual can lawfully possess 
many things that can be used as weapons. A 
hammer, or a baseball bat, can be used as a very 
effective M235 weapon."), or is carrying nothing 
that could be used as a weapon. 
Although it is admittedly difficult to quantify the 
precise individual interests at issue, Supreme Court 
precedent strongly suggests that a driver retains 
some reasonable expectations of privacy and 
security regarding his vehicle and its contents, even 
when those contents are illegal. In Long, for 
example, the Supreme Court held it permissible for 
a law enforcement officer to conduct a "Terry 
patdown" of the passenger compartment of a 
vehicle if the officer had reasonable suspicion that 
the driver was dangerous and might gain immediate 
control of a weapon. 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. 
3469. Although the Court did not discuss at length 
the individual interests implicated by such 
patdowns, it can be inferred from the reasonable 
suspicion requirement that the driver of a vehicle 
possesses some residual privacy interests in the 
interior compartment of a lawfully stopped vehicle, 
as well as in the contents of that compartment (even 
if those contents include weapons). In other words, 
if a driver possesses no such residual privacy 
interests, the Court presumably would not have 
imposed the reasonable suspicion requirement, and 
would instead have allowed such patdowns as a 
matter of course in all traffic stops. [FN8] 
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FN8. The Supreme Court is not alone in 
recognizing that a driver in a routine traffic 
stop retains some measure of individual 
privacy. This court has likewise held that 
a driver retains an expectation of privacy 
in his or her vehicle and its contents. 
United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1553 
(10th Cir.1993). Indeed, we have held that 
this expectation of privacy extends to 
secret compartments within a vehicle, even 
though such compartments "are most often 
used to conceal narcotics, weapons, or 
large amounts of cash.'* Id. at 1554. As 
we noted in reaching this conclusion, if a 
person's expectation of privacy in his 
automobile "is to be protected at all, there 
appears to be no reason to treat searches of 
secret compartments within the vehicle on 
any different basis than searches of the 
glove compartment or trunk." Id. 
Balancing the two parts of the equation against 
each other, I conclude that the individual privacy 
interests implicated by the government's proposed 
bright-line rule outweigh what I perceive to be the 
very minimal safety risks that exist at or near die 
conclusion of a routine traffic stop. Thus, I reject 
the government's proposed bright-line rule because, 
in my view, it is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Because the majority reaches a different conclusion 
and agrees to adopt the proposed bright-line rule, I 
find it necessary to highlight what I believe are 
some additional flaws in the rule. Aside from the 
fact that the rule flies in the face of the Supreme 
Court's general distaste for bright-line rules in the 
Fourth Amendment context, it is unprecedented in 
its breadth. In virtually every case in which the 
Supreme Court has been willing to announce a 
bright- line rule governing routine traffic stops, it 
has been careful to closely tailor the new rule to 
match the facts before it See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 
414, 117 S.Ct. 882 (authorizing officer to order 
passengers out of vehicle); New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 
(1981) (authorizing full search of passenger 
compartment pursuant to a custodial arrest); 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330 (authorizing 
officer to order driver out of vehicle). Here, in 
contrast, the rule has only a minimal connection to 
the facts before us, and is so broad that it apparently 
applies at any stage of a routine traffic stop. 
Despite its breadth, I am not convinced that the rule 
will do much to reduce the safety risks faced by 
officers conducting routine traffic stops. As it now 
stands, existing precedent affords officers a number 
of measures to "protect themselves*1236 from 
danger." Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117, 119 S.Ct. 484. 
As a matter of course, an officer can remove a 
driver from a vehicle. If an officer reasonably 
suspects a driver may be armed and dangerous, he 
can frisk the driver and/or conduct a "patdown" 
search of the passenger compartment. The question 
is therefore what, if any, protection the rule affords 
an officer in those situations where he does not have 
a reasonable suspicion that the driver of a stopped 
vehicle may be armed and dangerous (since those 
are presumably the only situations where the officer 
would have to resort to questioning the driver about 
weapons, rather than simply conducting a patdown 
of the driver and passenger compartment). 
According to the majority, most drivers will answer 
truthfully if asked about the presence of loaded 
weapons. This is a dubious assumption in my view, 
at least in those situations where the driver is 
considering using a weapon against the officer. 
Moreover, by authorizing questions only about 
"loaded weapons," the rule affords virtually no 
protection in those situations in which a driver 
possesses an unloaded weapon and ammunition, 
since the driver can truthftdly answer "no" to the 
officer's question. Finally, although I agree that a 
question about loaded weapons can perhaps provide 
an officer with clues about a driver, I am also 
concerned that the question can, at least in some 
instances, create the possibility of violence where it 
otherwise did not exist 
IV. 
Having rejected botfif of the government's 
arguments, I am left with the conclusion that Officer 
Tucker's question about weapons was unreasonable 
and violated the Fourth Amendment. The question 
remains, however, whether Holt's consent to search 
was nevertheless valid. "A search preceded by a 
Fourth Amendment violation remains valid if the 
consent to search was voluntary in fact under the 
totality of the circumstances." United States v. 
Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir.1994); cf. 
United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th 
Cir.1996) (noting that "voluntary consent may be 
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given by a person who is detained"); United States 
v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1557-58 (10th Cir.1993) 
(holding that a defendant's consent to a search of his 
vehicle was voluntary even though police officer 
was in possession of defendant's license and 
registration at the time the officer requested consent 
to search). "The government bears the burden of 
proving the voluntariness of consent, and that 
burden is heavier when consent is given after an 
illegal [detention]." Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 881. "If 
the consent is not sufficiently an act of free will to 
purge the primary taint of the illegal detention, ... it 
must be suppressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' " 
United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th 
Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 
1444, 1453 (10th Cir.1989)). Three factors are 
relevant to the determination of whether a detainee's 
consent was an act of free will: "the temporal 
proximity of the illegal detention and the consent, 
any intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the 
purpose and flagrancy of the officer's unlawful 
conduct" Id. at 818 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 
(1975)). Because the district court did not address 
this issue, I would remand the case to the district 
court for findings on the issue of the voluntariness 
of Holf s consent See Walker, 933 F.2d at 818. 
HENRY, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I join with Parts I and II of Judge Briscoe's opinion 
in concluding that non- consensual police 
encounters should continue to be measured by the 
parameters of *\231Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny, 
which specifically means that die government must 
demonstrate that an investigative detention "was 
sufficiently limited in scope and duration" Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct 1319, 75 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (emphasis added). 
However, I join in Parts I and II of Judge Ebel's 
opinion, with the following caveats: (1) In Part I, I 
do not agree that questions of travel plans are 
before us and thus I express no opinion on whether 
travel plan questions are within the scope of all 
traffic stops; and (2) I agree with Part II's holding 
that there is a narrow exception afforded during 
traffic stops to inquire about the presence of 
firearms, in the interest of officer safety. I am not 
convinced that the statistical data upon which Part 
II relies is dispositive, but considered in the context 
of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 
330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) and Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 
41 (1997), I am persuaded that a narrow 
officer-safety exception is appropriate. Indeed, 
local state law enforcement must make their own 
determinations about whether or not the interests of 
ensuring officer safety are furthered by asking about 
the presence of firearms. 
To restate, in my view, we are declaring a narrow 
personal safety exception to the Terry scope and 
duration: During a valid traffic stop, officers may 
ask the occupants of the vehicle about the presence 
of loaded firearms. In my opinion, this questioning 
would also extend to ask about the presence of 
unloaded weapons, for the risk of violent response 
to either is similar. See McLaughlin v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 16, 17, 106 S.Ct 1677, 90 L.Ed.2d 
15 (1986) (affirming lower court's conclusion that 
petitioner's unloaded gun was a " 'dangerous 
weapon' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) 
"); United States v. Boyd, 924 F.2d 945, 948 (9th 
Cir.1991) (noting that unloaded weapons, like 
loaded weapons "instill( ] fear in victims and 
bystanders, creating the risk of violent response"); 
United States v. Benson, 725 F.Supp. 69, 73 
(D.Me.1989) (recognizing "that the display of such 
a [unloaded] weapon instills fear in the average 
citizen and creates a danger that the unloaded 
weapon may evoke a violent response from police 
or others") (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
addition, as the government suggests, this narrow 
exception would not run afoul of Fourth 
Amendment limitations "as long as such 
questioning does not prolong the duration of the 
stop or alter its fundamental character as a Terry 
-type detention." Govt's Petition for Reh'g En Banc 
at 11; see id. at 14, 88 Si€t. 1868. 
Finally, and most importantly, we reiterate the 
practical implications of such questioning and the 
elicited response: First, "the detainee is not 
obligated to respond. And, unless the detainee's 
answers provide the officer with probable cause to 
arrest him, he must then be released." Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct 3138, 82 
L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, 
as the majority points out, a "refusal to answer 
furnishes no basis for an arrest although it may 
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alert the officer to the need for continued 
observation."* Terry, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868 
(White, J., concurring). Any "continued 
observation" must be tempered by the scope and 
duration requirements of Terry. See INS v. Delgado 
466 U.S. 210, 216-17, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 
247 (1984) (notmg that the "Fourth Amendment 
imposes some minimal level of objective 
justification to validate the detention or seizure," in 
the face of a refusal to respond). Similarly, as the 
government acknowledged during oral argument, in 
the face of a negative response, any further 
detention must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion. See *1238United States v. Soto, 988 
F.2d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir.1993) ( "Whether such 
an investigative detention is supported by an 
objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 
does not depend upon any one factor, but on the 
totality of the circumstances."). 
PAUL KELLY, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part 
I concur in Judge Ebel's opinion in its entirety, but 
write separately to emphasize my dissent from Part 
II of Judge Briscoe's opinion in light of the en banc 
court's disposition of the officer safety issue. 
Having decided that an officer may ask a stopped 
motorist whether there is a loaded firearm in the car 
even in the absence of particularized suspicion, it is 
totally unnecessary for the en banc court to decide 
whether Terry stops are constrained only in terms of 
duration, and not in terms of scope. See United 
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5tfa 
Cir.1993). Because the case must be remanded for 
additional analysis under the officer safety 
rationale, it is at best premature to decide the outer 
limits of permissible questioning in these 
circumstances, and at worst completely advisory 
and inappropriate. There is nothing in the record, 
other than about the firearm, to support the 
far-ranging implications contained in Part II. 
Moreover, no facts yet establish that Officer 
Tucker's questioning unrelated to officer safety 
resulted in the statements or evidence sought to be 
suppressed. While it is true that Officer Tucker 
asked about Holt's drug history, the questions were 
posed after the questioning about the loaded firearm 
and in response to Holt's volunteering that he did 
not use drugs anymore. ApltApp. at 42-43. 
Thereafter, Holt gave consent to search. [FN1] Id. 
at 43. Nothing in this record suggests that Holt's 
providing information about his previous drug use 
had anything to do with his consent. Officer Tucker 
went to the loaded pistol behind the passenger seat, 
id. at 45, and a local officer went to the camper, 
looked in and found a white powdery substance. Id. 
at 47. Casesmust be decided (and read) against 
their facts. Here, we are announcing a Fourth 
Amendment rule in search of facts. 
FN1. Although Holt testified that he never 
told Officer Tucker that he had a loaded 
firearm in the car and that he did not 
consent to a search, the district court 
rejected this testimony as incredible. 
LUCERO, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge 
SEYMOUR joins, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
Having joined Judge Briscoe's opinion in its 
entirety, I write separately to emphasize two points. 
First, Officer Tucker stated in the suppression 
hearing that he did not "remember feeling 
threatened" by Holt prior to asking Holt about the 
presence of a loaded weapon in the car. 
(Appellant's App. at 44.) Thus, the only direct 
evidence we have as to the officer's particularized 
suspicion to justify the interrogation is that there 
was none. Had Officer Tucker expressed a concern 
about his safety, we would review to determine 
whether that concern was reasonable under Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968), and that would end the matter. Given the 
officer's lack of concern for his own safety, I think it 
inappropriate to reach out and create law that but 
for the en banc nature of these proceedings would 
essentially be dicta. 
Second, the law in this Circuit, and the eventual 
conclusion of the en banc court, is that traffic stops 
are governed by the standards laid down in Terry. 
See, e.g., United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 
1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998); *\239United States v. 
Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 1997). 
"[Wjhere [a police officer] has reason to believe 
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 
individual," the officer may undertake "a reasonable 
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search for weapons for the protection of the police 
officer." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 
Courts will defer "not to [the officer's] inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled 
to draw." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly held that, upon an articulable and 
reasonable belief the motorist is potentially 
dangerous, a police officer may search the interior 
compartment of the car that has been stopped. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103 
S.Ct 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). However, a 
police officer may not search a car during a traffic 
stop without such suspicion. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 
U.S. 113, 119, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 
(1998). 
Allowing the police in this case, and in all future 
cases in which there is no particularized suspicion, 
to interrogate stopped motorists as to the presence 
of loaded weapons is contradictory to the rule laid 
down in Terry. The average American citizen 
stopped for speeding while hurrying to drop 
children off at school will not only find it bizarre, 
but more than minimally intrusive, to be confronted 
with questions about loaded weapons. It seems 
extraordinary to me that we, as a court, are 
arrogating unto ourselves the right to alter the 
clearly established Supreme Court precedent in 
Terry, and are thereby eroding the constitutional 
rights of American citizens. If the jurisprudence of 
the United States Supreme Court is to be altered, 
that task belongs to the Court itself. See Thurston 
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 
533, 535, 103 S.Ct 1343, 75 L.EA2d 260 (1983) 
(per curiam); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 
1363 (7th Cir.1996) ("[T]he Supreme Court has 
told the lower federal courts, in increasingly 
emphatic, even strident, terms, not to anticipate an 
overruling of a decision by the Court; we are to 
leave the overruling to die Court itself." (citation 
omitted)). 
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
I join parts I and II of Judge Briscoe's opinion. In 
particular, I fully agree with Judge Briscoe that the 
analytical framework set forth in Terry applies to 
traffic stops, even those based upon probable cause, 
and that Terry requires an analysis of both the scope 
and the duration of a stop to determine whether an 
officer's actions during the stop comported with the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Although the issue is not addressed in Judge 
Briscoe's en banc opinion, in the panel majority 
opinion authored by Judge Briscoe she expressed 
doubt whether questions relating to a detained 
motorist's travel plans were appropriate in light of 
Terry's scope requirement. See United States v. 
Holt, 229 F.3d 931, 937 (10th Cir.2000). In her 
majority opinion for the court, Judge Briscoe has 
declined to reach the issue, noting that the issue is 
not implicated by the facts of this case. 
Nevertheless, in a portion of his opinion joined by 
three other members of the en banc court, Judge 
Ebel has now suggested that questions regarding 
travel plans are always within the scope of a traffic 
stop. See Opinion of Judge Ebel at 1221 ("Travel 
plans typically are related to the purpose of a traffic 
stop because the motorist is traveling at the time of 
the stop."). 
Although I concur in the majority's decision not to 
definitively decide this issue, I feel compelled to 
offer the following observations regarding the 
approach advocated in Judge Ebel's opinion. For 
those reasons cogently stated by Judge Ebel in his 
*1240 panel dissent, I disagree that questions 
relating to travel plans are related to the purpose of 
a roadside traffic stop. See Holt, 229 F.3d at 942 
(Ebel, J., dissenting) ("When a car is stopped for 
speeding or for a straightforward traffic violation, 
as opposed to being stopped on suspicion that the 
driver is falling asleep or driving erratically (in 
which case the officer would be legitimately 
concerned with how much further the driver 
intended to travel), it is difficult to explain how 
questions concerning the travel plans of the 
occupant are reasonably related to the 
circumstances which justified the stop."); id. 
(Ebel, J., dissenting) (describing questions relating 
to travel plans as "wholly unrelated to the purpose 
of the stop"). Judge Ebel's en banc opinion offers 
no convincing rationale for the abandonment of his 
previous analysis of this question and its 
replacement with a one-size-fits-all rule holding that 
questions regarding travel plans are invariably 
within the scope of a traffic stop. Furthermore, in 
light of the fact that Holt was never asked any 
questions regarding his travel plans, this is an odd 
case within which to advocate such a rule. In the 
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words of Judge Kelly, it appears that Judge Ebel 
and those who have joined his opinion are 
suggesting "a Fourth Amendment rule in search of 
facts " Opinion of Judge Kelly at 1238. 
Although I disagree with Judge Ebel's suggestion 
that questions regarding travel plans are always 
related to the purpose of a traffic stop, I nonetheless 
am of the view that facially innocuous questions, 
including those relating to travel plans, are proper 
during a routine traffic stop as long as they do not 
extend the duration of the stop. In my view, Terry 's 
scope requirement is a common sense limitation on 
the power of law enforcement officers. It prevents 
law enforcement officials from fundamentally 
altering the nature of the stop by converting it into a 
general inquisition about past, present, and future 
wrongdoing, absent an mdependent basis for 
reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause. 
The scope doctrine does not, however, prevent 
officers from engaging in facially innocuous dialog 
which a detained motorist would not reasonably 
perceive as altering the fundamental nature of the 
stop. Accordingly, I do not think it necessary to 
suggest that questions about a detained motorist' 
travel pians are invariably related to the purpose of 
the stop in order to conclude that they are proper 
under ferry 
I join parts III and IV of Judge Briscoe's opinion in 
then: entirety. I agree with Judge Briscoe that the 
bright-line rule adopted by the majority allowing 
law enforcement officials to routinely ask about the 
presence of weapons during a traffic stop is 
inconsistent with the scope requirement set out by 
the Supreme Court in Terry and is unnecessary to 
ensure officer safety. I ftirther agree with Judge 
Briscoe that no reasonable officer would have 
feared for his safety at the time Officer Tucker 
asked Holt about the presence of weapons. 
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